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<ul class="summary-list"><li>One of the most brutal and beautiful KOs of the year landed Sunday at a <keyword id="12107767" type="UNKNOWN" weightage="60" keywordseo="muay-thai" source="Orion">Muay Thai</keyword> event.</li><li><keyword id="13553028" type="UNKNOWN" weightage="60" keywordseo="said-kabil" source="Orion">Said Kabil</keyword>'s axe kick dazed his opponent. He then landed three punch-perfect shots.</li></ul>This Knockout of the Year candidate, on a blood-splattered Muay Thai canvas, is as satisfying as it is horrifying.It all went down Sunday at Indigo at the O2 in London during the Muay Thai Grand Prix event that featured a bout between Said Kabil and Gary Corbett.Kabil threw a well-executed axe kick at Corbett and connected so cleanly that the strike dazed him, before following with a punch-perfect combination of shots — a straight right hand, a right uppercut, and a left hook.The first shot in that flurry of strikes knocked Corbett out cleanly. And, though he was technically unconscious, his body did not drop to the floor straight away and it appeared like he was suspended in animation.That's when Kabil, who was in the midst of launching his fight-finishing sequence, landed that uppercut and left hook. Corbett was finally on the ground. It was all over.Striking at this elite level can look beautiful and brutal.And you can watch it for yourself right here:<a href="https://www.instagram.com/p/Cb5-X4SqHyo/" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Posting on his Instagram account</a>, Kabil said it was hard to describe the feelings he had after the result had been confirmed."I haven't fought in two years because of COVID, and had no opportunities," the fighter said. "I'm finally back and really hungry. I can't wait to fight again and take over this division."Kabil also posted an alternative angle of the knockout sequence.See it here:The Muay Thai Grand Prix promotion said Corbett, who suffered the devastating KO, "is doing ok."

This Knockout of the Year candidate, on a blood-splattered canvas, is as satisfying as it is horrifying

<div class="KonaFilter image-container display-table float_right click-to-enlarge"><div><div class="image"><a title_source="Screenshot" title_caption="Here's Och-Ziff's self-definition." class="zoomin" href="https://static-ssl.businessinsider.com/image/551591eaecad04cf53fe0c0c-960/och-ziff-definition.png"></a><a href="http://www.ozcap.com/our_firm/index">Screenshot</a>Here's Och-Ziff's self-definition.</div></div></div>Hedge funds might have an image problem. At least, that's what some managers seem to think. Pershing Square, Och-Ziff, Baupost Group, and others have dropped the term "hedge fund" from their public filings and investor notes - or buried it deeply in annual reports, <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/some-hedge-funds-just-dont-call-us-a-hedge-fund-1427401282">The Wall Street Journal's Rob Copeland noted</a>.AQR Capital Management, for example, defines its services as "a spectrum of alternative investments." Co-founder David Kabiller said that "labels can create a lot of emotions" and told the Journal his own mom doesn't even like the term. Other firms are being more upfront about their semantic switch. "We actually don't see ourselves as a hedge fund," wrote Baupost founder Seth Klarman in a note to investors. He now refers to the business as a "series of investment partnerships."The other reason funds might be making the change is to market themselves like more traditional funds - or to avoid being compared with other hedge funds.It's easy for managers to play with the wording because hedge funds don't fall under one agreed-upon regulatory definition. For the record, though, here's the <a href="http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm">SEC's definition</a>: Like mutual funds, hedge funds pool investors' money and invest the money in an effort to make a positive return. Hedge funds typically have more flexible investment strategies than mutual funds. Many hedge funds seek to profit in all kinds of markets by using leverage (in other words, borrowing to increase investment exposure as well as risk), short-selling and other speculative investment practices that are not often used by mutual funds.And yet, according to the Journal, only 1,176 of 8,000 hedge funds actually refer to themselves as such on their websites. <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/some-hedge-funds-just-dont-call-us-a-hedge-fund-1427401282">Read the full story in the WSJ&gt;&gt;</a> <div class="margin-top"> <h3>NOW WATCH: <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-robots-customer-orders-warehouses-2014-12">Watch Amazon's New Robots Fill Customer Orders And Do The Heavy Lifting At Its Warehouses</a></h3> <div> <div> <div class="ooyala-video-player" data-video-autoplay="false" data-video-id="Z5dTIycjqQVyrDpdDlcj9TEW5ylFYUQE" data-player-variable="ooyalapopvideo" id="ooyalaplayer_popvideo" style="width:1280px;height:720px"></div> </div> </div> </div>

Hedge funds don't want to be called hedge funds anymore

<div class="KonaFilter image-container float_right"><div class="image on-image">REUTERS/James Lawler Duggan<keyword id="6358963" type="PERSON" weightage="60" keywordseo="Warren-Buffett">Warren Buffett</keyword></div></div>Warren Buffett is arguably the greatest investor of all time.
Unlike some other famous investors who swing for the fences and hit home runs every once in a while, Buffett is known for his low-volatility returns over a very long period.
Indeed, <a href="http://www.nber.org/papers/w19681">a new NBER paper</a> via <a href="https://twitter.com/counterparties/status/407534335189716993">Counterparties</a> shows that "Buffett's returns appear to be neither luck nor magic, but, rather, reward for the use of leverage combine with a focus on cheap, safe, quality stocks."
In other words, he buys boring stocks that offer steady, low returns, but he amplifies those returns by betting with borrowed money.
"We estimate that Buffett's leverage is about 1.6-to-1 on average," write authors Andrea Frazzini, David Kabiller and Lass H. Pedersen. They've <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/how-warren-buffett-really-makes-money-2013-3">written about this before</a>.
So can you copy Buffett's <keyword id="35175" type="UNKNOWN" weightage="60" keywordseo="investing">investing</keyword> strategy?
The short answer is yes and no.
Anyone can invest in boring stocks. But not everyone can borrow as cheaply as Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway.
The authors identify at least four reasons why Buffett is able to borrow so cheaply (emphasis added):
In addition to considering the magnitude of Buffett's leverage, it is also interesting to consider his sources of leverage including their terms and costs. Berkshire's debt has benefitted from being highly rated, enjoying a AAA rating from 1989 to 2009. As an illustration of the low financing rates enjoyed by Buffett, Berkshire issued the first ever negative-coupon security in 2002, a senior note with a warrant.
Berkshire's more anomalous cost of leverage, however, is due to its insurance float. Collecting insurance premia up front and later paying a diversified set of claims is like taking a "loan." Table 3 shows that the estimated average annual cost of Berkshire's insurance float is only 2.2%, more than 3 percentage points below the average T-bill rate. Hence, Buffett's low-cost insurance and reinsurance business have given him a significant advantage in terms of unique access to cheap, term leverage. We estimate that 36% of Berkshire's liabilities consist of insurance float on average.
Based on the balance sheet data, Berkshire also appears to finance part of its capital expenditure using tax deductions for accelerated depreciation of property, plant and equipment as provided for under the IRS rules. E.g., Berkshire reports $28 Billion of such deferred tax liabilities in 2011 (page 49 of the Annual Report). Accelerating depreciation is similar to an interest-free loan in the sense that (i) Berkshire enjoys a tax saving earlier than it otherwise would have, and (ii) the dollar amount of the tax when it is paid in the future is the same as the earlier savings (i.e. the tax liability does not accrue interest or compound).
Berkshire's remaining liabilities include accounts payable and derivative contract liabilities. Indeed, Berkshire has sold a number of derivative contracts, including writing index option contracts on several major equity indices, notably put options, and credit default obligations (see, e.g., the 2011 Annual Report). Berkshire states:
We received the premiums on these contracts in full at the contract inception dates ... With limited exceptions, our equity index put option and credit default contracts contain no collateral posting requirements with respect to changes in either the fair value or intrinsic value of the contracts and/or a downgrade of Berkshire's credit ratings. - Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., Annual Report, 2011.
Hence, Berkshire's sale of derivatives may both serve as a source of financing and as a source of revenue as such derivatives tend to be expensive (Frazzini and Pedersen (2012)). Frazzini and Pedersen (2012) show that investors that are either unable or unwilling to use leverage will pay a premium for instruments that embed the leverage, such as option contracts and levered ETFs. Hence, Buffett can profit by supplying this embedded leverage as he has a unique access to stable and cheap financing.
So, unless your a multibillion AAA-rated insurance conglomerate, you're not going to be able to invest like Buffett.

REVEALED: Why You Will Never Be Able To Invest Like Warren Buffett

<div class="image-container float_right" style="width:400px"><div class="image"></div><a href="https://secure.gettyimages.com/SubscriptionDownload/Download/137296600">Theo Wargo / Getty Images</a></div>Sorry, but you'll never be able to replicate the investment strategy that has made <keyword id="6358963" type="PERSON" weightage="60" keywordseo="Warren-Buffett">Warren Buffett</keyword> a billionaire.
To be clear, we're not suggesting that <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/warren-buffett-annual-letter-quotes-2013-3">the principles of long-term, value investing are worthless</a>.
But a recent study concludes that Buffett's win-streak is about much more than savvy stock-picking.
According to AQR Capital Management's Andrea Frazzini and David Kabiller and NYU's Lasse Pedersen, Buffett's returns are driven by a combination of investing in low-beta stocks and employing low-cost leverage.
In other words, he bets on stocks with low, yet stable returns, and he amplifies those returns by betting with cheap borrowed money.
That second part is key because not everyone has access to the type of cheap financing one can get when one is a billionaire backed by a multi-billion dollar corporation betting on hundreds of millions of dollars worth of stocks.
"We estimate that Berkshire’s average leverage is about 1.6-to-1 and that it relies on unusually low-cost and stable sources of financing," write the authors in their paper, "<a href="http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=4&amp;ved=0CEgQFjAD&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.econ.yale.edu%2F~af227%2Fpdf%2FBuffett%2527s%2520Alpha%2520-%2520Frazzini%2C%2520Kabiller%2520and%2520Pedersen.pdf&amp;ei=o_MwUY7DLo220AGX3ICACA&amp;usg=AFQjCNH9nJcTbB6BRHHqGwES7HZgImnQFw&amp;sig2=FYqCkXvREr5eDI2lbvt3GA&amp;bvm=bv.43148975,d.dmQ&amp;cad=rja">Buffett's Alpha</a>."
They identify four reasons why Buffett's leverage costs are so low (emphasis ours):
In addition to considering the magnitude of Buffett’s leverage, it is also interesting to consider his sources of leverage including their terms and costs. Berkshire’s debt has benefitted from being highly rated, enjoying a AAA rating from 1989 to 2009. As an illustration of the low financing rates enjoyed by Buffett, Berkshire issued the first ever negative-coupon security in 2002, a senior note with a warrant.
Berkshire’s more anomalous cost of leverage, however, is due to its insurance float. Collecting insurance premiums up front and later paying a diversified set of claims is like taking a “loan.” Table 3 shows that the estimated average annual cost of Berkshire’s insurance float is only 2.2%, more than 3 percentage points below the average T-bill rate. Hence, Buffett’s low-cost insurance and reinsurance businesses have given him a significant advantage in terms of unique access to cheap, term leverage. We estimate that 36% of Berkshire’s liabilities consist of insurance float on average.
Based on the balance sheet data, Berkshire also appears to finance part of its capital expenditure using tax deductions for accelerated depreciation of property, plant and equipment as provided for under the IRS rules. E.g., Berkshire reports $28 Billion of such deferred tax liabilities in 2011 (page 49 of the Annual Report). Accelerating depreciation is similar to an interest-free loan in the sense that (i) Berkshire enjoys a tax saving earlier than it otherwise would have, and (ii) the dollar amount of the tax when it is paid in the future is the same as the earlier savings (i.e. the tax liability does not accrue interest or compound).
Berkshire’s remaining liabilities include accounts payable and derivative contract liabilities. Indeed, Berkshire has sold a number of derivative contracts, including writing index option contracts on several major equity indices, notably put options, and credit default obligations (see, e.g., the 2011 Annual Report)...Hence, Berkshire’s sale of derivatives may both serve as a source of financing and as a source of revenue as such derivatives tend to be expensive (Frazzini and Pedersen (2012)). Frazzini and Pedersen (2012) show that investors that are either unable or unwilling to use leverage will pay a premium for instruments that embed the leverage, such as option contracts and levered ETFs. Hence, Buffett can profit by supplying this embedded leverage as he has a unique access to stable and cheap financing.
This is not intended to discredit Buffett's accomplishments. Indeed, this is an extremely sophisticated and smart strategy.
But the bottom line is that the average investor cannot replicate Buffett's strategy.
Download the paper at <a href="http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=4&amp;ved=0CEgQFjAD&amp;url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.econ.yale.edu%2F~af227%2Fpdf%2FBuffett%2527s%2520Alpha%2520-%2520Frazzini%2C%2520Kabiller%2520and%2520Pedersen.pdf&amp;ei=o_MwUY7DLo220AGX3ICACA&amp;usg=AFQjCNH9nJcTbB6BRHHqGwES7HZgImnQFw&amp;sig2=FYqCkXvREr5eDI2lbvt3GA&amp;bvm=bv.43148975,d.dmQ&amp;cad=rja">Yale.edu</a>.
SEE ALSO: <a href="http://www.businessinsider.com/wall-streets-most-worrying-charts-2013-3">The scariest charts in the world &gt;</a>

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This Knockout of the Year candidate, on a blood-splattered canvas, is as satisfying as it is horrifying

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