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Imagine this. You have a younger sibling you’re mighty envious of. And why not? Unlike you, they seem to enjoy all the freedom and money in the world. They party like there’s no tomorrow, and here you are, stuck in a boring, ultra-disciplined but responsible routine that feels completely devoid of any independence, and mostly, funds. But of late, things are changing. This sibling is in massive trouble and just cannot escape the parent’s wrath anymore. Long story short, the party is over, and it is time to go back home. The rising defaults on this sibling’s part have now begun pulling the entire house down, thereby attracting the regulator’s ire. <h2>The Wild West of microfinance and unsecured loans</h2>It's hard to ignore the issues with microfinance and unsecured loans in India. Many saw them as a small gamble and ignored the rising defaults much like the younger siblings’ tantrums, and now they find themselves in hot waters. The skyrocketing instances of non-payments aren't a micro-issue anymore and are threatening the stability of the entire banking system. In the quarter ended September 30, 2024, 5 of India’s 8 largest private sector <keyword id="19934118" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="banks" source="keywords">banks</keyword> reported a steep rise in their bad loan book, mostly thanks to microfinance loans. Some banks, in a bid to strengthen their fortress against these <keyword id="142154" type="General" weightage="100" keywordseo="bad-loans" source="Orion">bad loans</keyword>, have significantly upped their provisions. For instance, <keyword id="46717" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="IndusInd-bank" source="Orion">IndusInd Bank</keyword> set aside Rs 525 crore during July and September 2024 to battle the menace of defaults on microfinance loans, which make up about 9% of its total loan book. See, banks rely heavily on their interest income, which they earn from advancing loans. Any loan where the borrower has not paid interest to the bank or defaulted for 90 days or more becomes bad, i.e., an <keyword id="79363" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="npa" source="Orion">NPA</keyword>, or non-performing asset for the bank. And who likes things going bad? Simply put, there has been a steep rise in three areas, much to the dislike of banks and MFIs (micro-finance institutions). But hey, it's mostly their doing! <ol><li>GNPA ratio (gross net performing assets): The quantum of non-performing assets a bank has in proportion to its total assets.</li><li>Provision: The amount banks set aside to take care of such NPAs.</li><li>Slippage ratio: The rate at which good girls go bad, or the speed at which good loans turn into NPAs</li></ol>But how are these plaguing the Indian banking sector? And what does the road ahead look like? We decode it for you. <h2> Microfinance: A not-so-micro-menace</h2>Microfinance loans were initially brought forth for low-income households and individuals, i.e. for those who might not generally have access to traditional ways of credit, like bank loans and more. They don’t require collateral or an asset to be pledged in lieu of the loan, making it a tad bit easier for borrowers. As of June 2024, the amount of outstanding loans in the microfinance industry stood at a staggering Rs 4,20,256 crore. Of this, NBFC-MFIs accounted for 40% and banks made for 33% of these. In 2022, <keyword id="30067" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="RBI" source="Orion">RBI</keyword>, in a bid to inspire some competition in this space, did something radical-they did away with the ceiling on how much interest MFIs could charge their customers. Previously, MFIs could add up to 12% to their cost of acquiring funds to determine the final interest rate chargeable to the consumer. So, assuming that Bank A incurs a 5% cost to acquire funds for further loaning, A could charge up to 17% interest from the end consumer. So, interest rates were in the hands of MFIs, and boy, did they have a gala time with it. Instead of spurring some healthy competition, as RBI expected, MFIs and banks went rogue and all guns blazing, competing for the title of “Who will charge the highest interest?” Recently, RBI banned 4 microfinance institutions (MFIs), namely Asirvad Micro Finance Limited, Arohan Financial Services Limited, DMI Finance Private Limited, and Navi Finserv, from disbursing loans effective October 21, 2024. Why? Because they were charging 14% extra interest over their original cost of funds. To maintain their loan books (and pockets), banks and NBFCs resorted to shady practices like netting off loans, which RBI has now advised MFIs against. Here, lenders allow borrowers to settle a previous outstanding loan by issuing them a new loan! As crazy as it sounds, it helped banks to report less of their total assets as NPAs, since the new credit would cover pending installments of the borrower’s previous loan. Then there was the issue of borrowers overleveraging, i.e. taking multiple loans using different IDs from various lenders and then failing to honor any of them. The consequence? Banks and NBFCs end up with massive NPAs. Data from credit bureaus suggests that over the last quarter, there was a 17.2% rise in the number of borrowers who had 5 or more active loans at the same time. <h2>Growth &gt; Caution</h2>It's an age-old tale unfolding yet again in India’s banking sector- Icarus flew too close to the sun and eventually, fell to its death. Between April and June 2024, NBFCs microfinance portfolio jumped by 2.7%. If you see this in terms of loan sources, microfinance loans issued by banks grew by 11.2% in Q1FY25. But the same portfolio in NBFCs swelled by almost double-23.9%. While most of these loans had an average ticket size between Rs 30,000-50,000, there was a sharp spike in the number of loans that had a ticket size of Rs 80,000 or more. Data suggests that as of March 2024, more than 12% of all microfinance borrowers had over 4 or more active loans. In dating parlance, this is a classic case of borrowers going polyamorous, minus the honesty and transparency. Not the best of situations, you'd agree! <h2>Will banks and NBFCs stand up to this stress?</h2>If their results for Q2FY25 are to be believed, NBFCs are not handling the pressure all that well. Or even slightly well. Only a few banks like Bank of Baroda (BoB), ICICI, and Indian Bank were up for the battle, even witnessing a decline in their loan delinquencies. Some others, like IndusInd Bank, saw their stock dip by a massive 16.2% over the last 5 days. Its slippages in the previous quarter burgeoned from Rs 15.3 billion in Q1FY25 to Rs 17.9 billion in Q2. As a result, the bank pushed a staggeringly high amount of money to create an NPA cushion for itself. While its management has highlighted its preference for secured lending, that was hardly reflected in its actions during the quarter, where growth in unsecured personal loans remained exceptionally high at over 7% on a QoQ basis. Turns out, only 44% of customers in IndusInd Banks’ microfinance loan portfolio were exclusive to it. The rest 47% were, you guessed it right-polyamorous! 27% had borrowed from another lender as well, apart from IndusInd Bank, while 20% were those who had outstanding loans with two other lenders, apart from IndusInd Bank. IndusInd Bank’s credit card segment did not miss the NPA bus and accounted for 7-8% of its GNPAs. Canara Bank’s total slippages during the previous quarter jumped to Rs 11.1 billion, up by 24.7% QoQ, and making up for 3.6% of its total loans. As for Bandhan Bank, its <keyword id="763994" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="Gross-NPA" source="Orion">gross NPA</keyword> for Q2FY25 inched up on a QoQ basis, up from 4.23% in Q1, to 4.68% in the second quarter. <keyword id="62152" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="IDFC-bank" source="Orion">IDFC Bank</keyword>’s heavy provisioning for its NPAs marred its profits significantly, causing its PAT (profit after tax) to dip by 73% on a YoY basis. Data from ICRA Analytics suggest that the AUM (asset under management) growth in microfinance loans and unsecured (personal and business) loans by the NBFCs will moderate to 10-12% and 19-21%, respectively, in FY2025 compared to 30% and 38%, in FY2024. Says A M Karthik, Senior Vice President &amp; Co-Group Head, Financial Sector Ratings, ICRA, “As bank funds constitute a larger share in the overall funding of NBFCs, a slower credit flow from banks to the NBFCs will compress their AUM growth. The NBFCs in unsecured and digital lending businesses shall face a higher squeeze in funding compared to others, and the unsecured lending space will continue to be a source of stress in the near term.” There has been uninhibited growth in unsecured loans, apart from just the microfinance segment. For instance, Axis Bank’s gross slippages jumped by Rs 4,443 crore, largely thanks to its unsecured business. The same is the case with Yes Bank, which saw 35–40% of its retail slippages emerging from the unsecured loan portfolio. Kotak Mahindra Bank was also quick to follow Yes Bank’s suit, with around 35%-40% of its slippages coming from credit cards. <h2>How is the road ahead?</h2>While RBI has just cracked its whip and served a warning at the moment, experts at Morgan Stanley believe that more changes (read regulatory lashes) are underway. Moreover, with both festive and wedding seasons underway in our country, unsecured lending might pick up momentum, much to the disdain of the calibrated approach banks have been taking towards it so far. But if the situation doesn't improve, RBI will not waste any time in becoming the typical tyrannical Bollywood headmaster who runs his dominion with an iron fist and takes things (and ceiling rates) into their own hands. However, that's a story for another day.

Is the lending party over? The dangerous tango of Indian banks with microfinance and unsecured loans

<div type="image" title="The RBI has cracked the regulatory whip on NBFCs and banks, who&amp;#39;ve been pushing microfinance and unsecured loans aggressively to grow their loan books." agency="ANI" msid="114778648" hostid="261" caption="&amp;lt;p&amp;gt;The RBI has cracked the regulatory whip on NBFCs and banks, who&amp;#39;ve been pushing microfinance and unsecured loans aggressively to grow their loan books.&amp;lt;/p&amp;gt;"></div> Imagine this. You have a younger sibling you’re mighty envious of. And why not? Unlike you, they seem to enjoy all the freedom and money in the world. They party like there’s no tomorrow, and here you are, stuck in a boring, ultra-disciplined but responsible routine that feels completely devoid of any independence, and mostly, funds. But of late, things are changing. This sibling is in massive trouble and just cannot escape the parent’s wrath anymore. Long story short, the party is over, and it is time to go back home. The rising defaults on this sibling’s part have now begun pulling the entire house down, thereby attracting the regulator’s ire. <h2>The Wild West of <keyword id="113684" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="microfinance" source="Orion">microfinance</keyword> and unsecured loans</h2>It's hard to ignore the issues with microfinance and unsecured loans in India. Many saw them as a small gamble and ignored the rising defaults much like the younger siblings’ tantrums, and now they find themselves in hot waters. The skyrocketing instances of non-payments aren't a micro-issue anymore and are threatening the stability of the entire banking system. In the quarter ended September 30, 2024, 5 of India’s 8 largest private sector <keyword id="19934118" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="banks" source="keywords">banks</keyword> reported a steep rise in their bad loan book, mostly thanks to microfinance loans. Some banks, in a bid to strengthen their fortress against these <keyword id="142154" type="General" weightage="100" keywordseo="bad-loans" source="Orion">bad loans</keyword>, have significantly upped their provisions. For instance, IndusInd Bank set aside Rs 525 crore during July and September 2024 to battle the menace of defaults on microfinance loans, which make up about 9% of its total loan book. See, banks rely heavily on their interest income, which they earn from advancing loans. Any loan where the borrower has not paid interest to the bank or defaulted for 90 days or more becomes bad, i.e. an NPA, or non-performing asset for the bank. And who likes things going bad? Simply put, there has been a steep rise in three areas, much to the dislike of banks and MFIs (micro-finance institutions). But hey, it's mostly their doing! <ol><li>GNPA ratio (gross net performing assets): The quantum of non-performing assets a bank has in proportion to its total assets.</li><li>Provision: The amount banks set aside to take care of such NPAs.</li><li>Slippage ratio: The rate at which good girls go bad, or the speed at which good loans turn into NPAs</li></ol>But how are these plaguing the Indian banking sector? And what does the road ahead look like? We decode it for you. <h2> Microfinance: A not-so-micro-menace</h2>Microfinance loans were initially brought forth for low-income households and individuals i.e. for those who might not generally have access to traditional ways of credit, like bank loans and more. They don’t require collateral or an asset to be pledged in lieu of the loan, making it a tad bit easier for borrowers. As of June 2024, the amount of outstanding loans in the microfinance industry stood at a staggering Rs 4,20,256 crore. Of this, NBFC-MFIs accounted for 40% and banks made for 33% of these. In 2022, RBI, in a bid to inspire some competition in this space, did something radical-they did away with the ceiling on how much interest MFIs could charge their customers. Previously, MFIs could add up to 12% to their cost of acquiring funds to determine the final interest rate chargeable to the consumer. So, assuming that Bank A incurs a 5% cost to acquire funds for further loaning, A could charge up to 17% interest from the end consumer. So, interest rates were in the hands of MFIs, and boy, did they have a gala time with it. Instead of spurring some healthy competition, as RBI expected, MFIs and banks went rogue and all guns blazing, competing for the title of “Who will charge the highest interest?” Recently, RBI banned 4 microfinance institutions (MFIs), namely Asirvad Micro Finance Limited, Arohan Financial Services Limited, DMI Finance Private Limited, and <keyword id="20117932" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="navi-finserv" source="keywords">Navi Finserv</keyword> from disbursing loans effective October 21, 2024. Why? Because they were charging 14% extra interest over their original cost of funds. To maintain their loan books (and pockets), banks and NBFCs resorted to shady practices like netting off loans, which RBI has now advised MFIs against. Here, lenders allow borrowers to settle a previous outstanding loan by issuing them a new loan! As crazy as it sounds, it helped banks to report less of their total assets as NPAs, since the new credit would cover pending instalments of the borrower’s previous loan. Then there was the issue of borrowers overleveraging, i.e. taking multiple loans using different IDs from various lenders and then failing to honour any of them. The consequence? Banks and NBFCs end up with massive NPAs. Data from credit bureaus suggests that over the last quarter, there was a 17.2% rise in the number of borrowers who had 5 or more active loans at the same time. <h2>Growth &gt; Caution</h2>It's an age-old tale unfolding yet again in India’s banking sector- Icarus flew too close to the sun and eventually, fell to its death. Between April and June 2024, NBFCs microfinance portfolio jumped by 2.7%. If you see this in terms of loan sources, microfinance loans issued by banks grew by 11.2% in Q1FY25. But the same portfolio in NBFCs swelled by almost double-23.9%. While most of these loans had an average ticket size between Rs 30,000-50,000, there was a sharp spike in the number of loans that had a ticket size of Rs 80,000 or more. Data suggests that as of March 2024, more than 12% of all microfinance borrowers had over 4 or more active loans. In dating parlance, this is a classic case of borrowers going polyamorous, minus the honesty and transparency. Not the best of situations, you'd agree! <h2>Will banks and NBFCs stand up to this stress?</h2>If their results for Q2FY25 are to be believed, NBFCs are not handling the pressure all that well. Or even slightly well. Only a few banks like Bank of Baroda (BoB), ICICI, and Indian Bank were up for the battle, even witnessing a decline in their loan delinquencies. Some others, like IndusInd Bank, saw their stock dip by a massive 16.2% over the last 5 days. Its slippages in the previous quarter burgeoned from Rs 15.3 billion in Q1FY25 to Rs 17.9 billion in Q2. As a result, the bank pushed a staggeringly high amount of money to create an NPA cushion for itself. While its management has highlighted its preference for secured lending, that was hardly reflected in its actions during the quarter, where growth in unsecured personal loans remained exceptionally high at over 7% on a QoQ basis. Turns out, only 44% of customers in IndusInd Banks’ microfinance loan portfolio were exclusive to it. The rest 47% were, you guessed it right-polyamorous! 27% had borrowed from another lender as well, apart from IndusInd Bank, while 20% were those who had outstanding loans with two other lenders, apart from IndusInd Bank. IndusInd Bank’s credit card segment did not miss the NPA bus and accounted for 7-8% of its GNPAs. Canara Bank’s total slippages during the previous quarter jumped to Rs 11.1 billion, up by 24.7% QoQ, and making up for 3.6% of its total loans. As for Bandhan Bank, its gross NPA for Q2FY25 inched up on a QoQ basis, up from 4.23% in Q1, to 4.68% in the second quarter. IDFC Bank’s heavy provisioning for its NPAs marred its profits significantly, causing its PAT (profit after tax) to dip by 73% on a YoY basis. Data from ICRA Analytics suggest that the AUM (asset under management) growth in microfinance loans and unsecured (personal and business) loans by the NBFCs will moderate to 10-12% and 19-21%, respectively, in FY2025 compared to 30% and 38%, in FY2024. Says A M Karthik, Senior Vice President &amp; Co-Group Head, Financial Sector Ratings, ICRA, “As bank funds constitute a larger share in the overall funding of NBFCs, a slower credit flow from banks to the NBFCs will compress their AUM growth. The NBFCs in unsecured and digital lending businesses shall face a higher squeeze in funding compared to others, and the unsecured lending space will continue to be a source of stress in the near term.” There has been uninhibited growth in <keyword id="6051027" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="Unsecured-loan" source="Orion">unsecured loan</keyword>s, apart from just the microfinance segment. For instance, Axis Bank’s gross slippages jumped by Rs 4,443 crore, largely thanks to its unsecured business. The same is the case with Yes Bank, which saw 35–40% of its retail slippages emerging from the unsecured loan portfolio. <keyword id="6376194" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="kotak-mahindra" source="Orion">Kotak Mahindra</keyword> Bank was also quick to follow Yes Bank’s suit, with around 35%-40% of its slippages coming from credit cards. <h2>How is the road ahead?</h2>While RBI has just cracked its whip and served a warning at the moment, experts at Morgan Stanley believe that more changes (read regulatory lashes) are underway. Moreover, with both festive and wedding seasons underway in our country, unsecured lending might pick up momentum, much to the disdain of the calibrated approach banks have been taking towards it so far. But if the situation doesn't improve, RBI will not waste any time in becoming the typical tyrannical <keyword id="19897820" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="bollywood" source="keywords">Bollywood</keyword> headmaster who runs his dominion with an iron fist. However, that's a story for another day. Do you have a topic in mind you'd want a simpler explanation for, or insights or personal experience to share on personal finance and more? Contact us at businessinsider@timesinternet.in.

Simply Put: Is the lending party over? The dangerous tango of Indian banks with microfinance and unsecured loans

On September 18, 2024, the US <keyword id="19900043" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="fed" source="keywords">Fed</keyword> delivered a jumbo-sized surprise to the global economy. Not only did they trim their interest rates by a massive 50 basis points to bring their yields down to 5%, but also hinted at further rate cuts in the upcoming months. This move from the fed and several other central banks globally had pushed expectations high for a similar rate slash closer home, from the <keyword id="19899808" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="rbi" source="keywords">RBI</keyword> this month. But governor <keyword id="19913110" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="shaktikanta-das" source="keywords">Shaktikanta Das</keyword>, in a “picture abhi baaki hai” moment, decided to hold the repo rates here steady, leaving them unchanged at 6.5% for the record 10th straight time. Although, he did tinker with the policy stand, changing it from “rate cuts are absolutely off the table” to a more accommodating “we’re okay with bringing down the rates, if needed”. This, rather neutral, stance from India’s financial custodian sparked hopes for a rate cut in December this year. However, the stubborn inflation levels in September have again dented such hopes. As consumers, you may be wondering what all the hullabaloo this is about, since it hardly makes a difference to your regular financial routine. Well, the majority of both economic growth and inflation is closely connected to this policy stance from the central bank and it does have a rather indirect effect on both our earnings and spending. But more directly, it would have clear implications for those looking to own a house. Even the slightest modification of interest rates, or the lack of it, influences the <keyword id="19916018" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="emi" source="keywords">EMI</keyword> you pay significantly. So, all aspiring homebuyers, is this the right time to take out a loan and buy a house? Can you expect a rate cut anytime soon, and what will that mean for your home-owning dreams? We lay it out. <h2>What’s the connection?</h2>You see, buying a house is no small feat, at least financially. The task becomes even more herculean if you are scouting for your own roof in cities like Delhi, Noida, Bangalore or Mumbai where, as Circuit from Munnabhai says, “room shuru hote hi khatam ho jata hai”. Naturally, you’ll have to take a <keyword id="6354730" type="General" weightage="100" keywordseo="home-loan" source="Orion">home loan</keyword> from the bank. Don’t be mistaken, the bank won't give you a loan that covers 100% of the value of the property you want to own. Rather, your loan amount will be equivalent to a certain percentage of the property’s total value. RBI’s guidelines on this are pretty clear: <ul><li>If your loan amount is up to Rs 30 lakh, you can get a loan worth 90% of the property’s value.</li></ul><ul><li>If the loan amount is between Rs 30 lakh and Rs 75 lakh, you are eligible for a loan worth 80% of the property’s value.</li><li>If you are taking a loan of more than Rs 75 lakh, your loan amount will be equivalent to 70% of the property’s value.</li></ul>Now assuming that you have the money, it's all about paying back the principal amount, but not without a little (read hefty) interest added on top. See, when you’re taking a home loan, you are actually signing up for a long-term, even multi-decadal financial commitment, which will unfailingly present itself to your bank accounts and finances every single month, in the form of EMIs, or equated monthly instalments). When you take a home loan, you can choose to pay the interest in two ways (talk about choices!). One is that you decide to keep a fixed rate of interest throughout the tenure of your home loan. So, if you opt for a 25-year fixed-rate home loan at the rate of 8.8% p.a., you’ll have to pay interest at this rate for the next 25 years, till your entire loan is paid off. Yes, you can go backsies and switch to a floating-rate home loan by paying a fee. Floating, as the name suggests, means that your interest rate is not set in stone. But starting October 2019, when it comes to a floating interest rate home loan, your payable interest and EMIs are directly impacted by any changes in <keyword id="20094323" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="repo-rate" source="keywords">repo rate</keyword>, which were left unchanged by RBI this time around. Why are these two so chummy, you might ask. Well, home loan interest rates are a sum of two things: <ol><li>Repo Rate (the rate at which RBI lends money to banks)</li><li>Operational cost + margins</li></ol>Any plus or minus in this equation would send your home loan interests tanking, or skyrocketing. Vivek Iyer, Partner, Grant Thornton Bharat explains that any change in the repo rates impacts the cost of funds and thereby the home loan interest rates. “When the interest rates are expected to reduce, the corresponding impact will be in the form of a reduced EMI. Home loan borrowers should always try to borrow at a floating rate when interest rates are expected to reduce and at a fixed rate when the interest rates are expected to increase. This minimizes the outflow in the form of EMIs that the home loan borrowers will experience”, he continues. So, no change in repo rates means no change in your home loan interest payout and no financial relief whatsoever. A rate cut, which most experts are anticipating will start this December, would mean your EMI payments come down, and your wallet might save a little more. But there’s also a chance of an UNO reverse happening. In case RBI is in the mood to hike the interest, your home loan EMIs might end up taking more from your pockets. Consider this. You took a floating interest rate home loan worth Rs 50 lakh in January 2022 at 8% p.a., for a period of 20 years. This brings your total monthly EMI to Rs Rs 41,822. But, as luck would (or won't) have it, RBI raised the interest rate by 250 basis points between May 2022 and February 2023, bringing it to its current status of 6.5%. Some back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that now, your home loan interest payout will also rise by a hefty 2.5%, taking the total to 10.5%. In other words, you’ll have to dish out Rs 49,919 per month as EMI. Now, won't you heave a sigh of relief if the RBI were to bring down the interest rate by say, even 50 basis points, or 0.5%? Agreed, your EMI will come down just marginally, to Rs 48,251. But look at this over a 20-year period, and you’ll see how big the difference is. <h2>Are rates set to change anytime soon?</h2>Generally, RBI hikes the repo rates if it sees inflation spiralling out of control. Then, in a bid to reduce consumer spending, it raises interest rates to make borrowing expensive. But when the apex bank sees sluggish consumption in the economy, inflation in control and wants to boost spending, it slashes down on interest rates, making it more lucrative for people to borrow. As of now, most experts are not anticipating any changes in the interest rates anytime soon. This means home loans are not getting cheaper anytime soon. The CPI data, which came out yesterday, saw inflation rise to 5.49% in September, compared to 3.65% last month. Food and beverage prices jumped to a four-month high of 8.36% in September, as opposed to a 5.3% rise in August. So a rate cut seems a no-go at the moment! Apurva Sheth, Head of Market Perspectives and Research, SAMCO Securities explains that the RBI had probably expected a hardening of inflation and that's why it chose to hold on to the rates in the monetary policy announcement last week. “Now, it seems that RBI will take a cautious stance going ahead and will not be in a hurry into rate cuts like its global peers”, he added. In all this, one thing is clear, in the grand movie of the Indian economy, the RBI has chosen stability over drama. And just like in every good Bollywood film, we're left wondering what twist the sequel will bring. Until then, it might be “The End" for rate cuts, but the show must go on for the Indian economy!

Boom or bust — how RBI’s decision to leave rates unchanged affects homebuyers

<div type="image" title="Are Indians depositing less money in banks, or more in mutual funds? Turns out, it&amp;#39;s neither of those." msid="113663806" hostid="261" sizebytes="1121785"></div> Over the past few months, there’s been a lot of brouhaha about the lagging pace of <keyword id="20202062" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="bank-deposits" source="keywords">bank deposits</keyword> in India. Simply put, the rate at which Indians are depositing their hard-earned money in banks has been falling constantly, and some blame the increasing financialisation of <keyword id="20751315" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="household-savings" source="keywords">household savings</keyword> in the country or the rising preference of Indians towards <keyword id="19929240" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="mutual-funds" source="keywords">mutual funds</keyword> and shares. So, the hypothesis is that people are choosing to invest more in mutual funds and the Indian <keyword id="19949641" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="equity-markets" source="keywords">equity markets</keyword> through direct investments, IPOs, or NFOs, the money flowing into Indian banks in the form of deposits is slowing down. But is that really the case? <h2>A crisis or a phase?</h2><keyword id="19899808" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="RBI" source="keywords" meta.keywordsubtype="org" meta.entityname="RBI" meta.hostid="261" meta.entityid="RBI">RBI</keyword> data suggested that for the quarter ended June 2024, bank deposits grew at 11.7%. On the other hand, credit growth has outpaced this at 15%. This means that the outflow from banks as loans is far greater than the inflow into them in the form of deposits in Q1 of FY 2024-25. The situation largely saw cut-copy-paste in the first week of September as well, with loans registering a 13.3% YoY growth during the period, while deposits rose only 11.1%. This gap has only been widening for the last 3 years. Since deposits are how banks gather assets to further lend and earn interest income as a consequence, even a slight dip could set the alarm bells ringing for banks, and rightfully so. And truth be told, mutual funds are indeed taking on bank deposits in a big way. Per a report by Franklin Templeton, in August 2024, the AUM (assets under management) of Indian mutual funds, or the total funds managed by them, stood at 31.3% of total bank deposits in the country, up from 24.20% during the year-ago period. As of August 2024, the AUM of mutual funds stood at Rs 66.17 lakh crore, an all-time high. But all said and done, is this really the reason why the rate of bank deposits is falling behind? SBI has dismissed this to be a “statistical myth”, and experts point out that since equity and fund houses also keep the cash in their respective bank accounts, there’s no cause for concern. So, is financialization really to be blamed for the trailing tempo of deposits? Or is something else happening behind the scenes? We take a closer look: <h2>First, are household deposits really slowing down? And is that a cause of concern?</h2>Data from Motilal Oswal suggests the contrary. Deposits grew by around 10.4% between March 2020 and August 2024. Data from RBI also highlights that as of August 9, 2024, bank deposits witnessed a YoY growth of 10.8%. The loan-to-deposit ratio for the retail segment, which indicates what percentage of its total deposits the banks lend out as loans, has stayed at 77.5%, above the 77% mark for the tenth straight month. <div type="image" title="Yes, household deposits (as % of total deposits) have dipped, but the drop is far from significant" msid="113663882" hostid="261" sizebytes="306706"></div> Also, we can’t forego the fact that the share of Indian households in bank deposits has indeed slowed down. However, data from Axis AMC shows that the dip is marginal—from 63% in 2022 to 62% in 2023 and 61% in 2024. What has slowed down even more considerably is the share of government deposits in the aggregate bank deposits, which has dipped from 14% in 2018 to 9% in 2024. So, it's not just household deposits, you see. Moreover, as of March 2024, the collective CASA ratio (current and <keyword id="114757" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="savings-account" source="Orion">savings account</keyword> deposits) of all commercial banks in India stood at 41.00%, down from 43.1% in March 2023 and 45.2% in March 2022, marking a nearly 5% point decline over the past year, while still staying over the 10-year average of 39.2%. This implies that Indian banks are relying more on higher-cost funds (savings accounts), which can limit their profitability. <h2>What is this financialisation of savings we are talking about?</h2>Then again, there is no doubt about the growing affinity of Indians towards mutual funds and stock markets. Recent data from CBDT (Central Board of Direct Taxes) highlights that India’s net direct tax collection surged by around 22%, driven exclusively by the significant uptick in the collection of Securities Transaction Tax (STT), which doubled to Rs 26,154 crore, from Rs 13,352 crore in the year-ago period. Why does this matter? STT is levied when you buy or sell equity shares on stock exchanges, sell <keyword id="6361918" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="equity-mutual-funds" source="Orion">equity mutual funds</keyword>, and trade in futures and options in the equity segment. Such taxes, including the multiple other taxes in equity market investments, are considered as leakages as the money moves out of the economy into government coffers. Data from a ValueQuest report explains that over the last 20 years, the markets have handsomely rewarded the investors, generating over $900 billion in incremental value for them. This is the major driver behind the dramatic rise in investment flowing towards the equity markets. There’s further proof of this budding romance, if you check the demat pudding. The number of demat accounts, which are a primary requisite for participating in the stock markets, also burgeoned by 42.3 lakh in August 2024, taking India’s total tally of demat accounts beyond 17 crore. To put this in perspective, this is almost equivalent to the population of just 8 nations in the world, including China, the US, Brazil and more. Vivek Iyer, Partner, Grant Thornton Bharat thinks it's rather important, as well. “Financialisation of household savings in India is an indication of deepening capital markets in the market, especially from a retail investor standpoint. Bank deposits with a modest rate of return are no longer the only option for savings for investors. Investors today have more avenues for wealth creation in the form of public capital markets, which have democratized wealth creation and provided equality of opportunity to retail investors”, he says. Yes, Indians are investing more and more in the markets, and in mutual funds. But is it a sin to look out for inflation-beating returns, which the stock markets offer, and vanilla bank deposits don't? After all, the allure of 12-13% annual returns offered by <keyword id="45369" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="equities" source="Orion">equities</keyword> can certainly pale the stability offered by good old deposits, which generally do not go beyond 9% when it comes to annual returns. But all of this is not what is behind the slowdown. India is still a toddler in the school of savings financialization, with less than 10% of the population holding a demat account, and less than 5% of us saving in equities. That's a drop in the ocean of deposits, far inadequate to trigger a tsunami. <h2>Tell me why lagging deposits have nothing to do with Indians investing more in mutual funds!</h2>Says Shweta Rajani, Head - Mutual Funds, Anand Rathi Wealth Limited, “Households' equity holdings composition grew from 11.1% in FY 23 to 14.7% in FY 24. This trend reflects a growing awareness of investment options, empowering individuals to take control of their financial futures. Despite this transition towards equities, banks still hold a significant share of household financial savings—33.5% in FY24 compared to 34.9% in FY23”. Also, household savings and their subsequent financialization do not have much to do with deposit creation, which is entirely made by banks. What actually drives increased deposits is credit growth or increased lending. When interest rates are eased, people tend to borrow more and spend more, which circulates more money in the economy. For the past 4 years, RBI has been tightening the screws on interest rates, which raises the cost of borrowings, and makes it more expensive to take loans, putting a dampener on credit growth, but effectively curbing inflationary pressures. The last time RBI cut the repo rate by 40 basis points was back in May 2020, 4 years ago. The lag in <keyword id="19998084" type="General" weightage="100" keywordseo="deposit-growth" source="keywords">deposit growth</keyword> we’re witnessing is almost 3 years old. Coincidence much, or just good old economics at work? But with the Fed recently setting a rate cut precedent by slashing 50 bps off its interest rate, RBI is expected to follow suit in the next MPC (Monetary Policy Committee) meeting, scheduled for November 2024. A rate cut would ease the aforementioned high cost of borrowing, and increase loan-taking for corporates and institutional investors, thereby stoking consumption in the economy. And then, deposit creation in banks is likely to return to its former glory. If not, then that would be a curious case to unravel! But that worry is for another day. Do you have insights or personal experience to share on your personal finances or money? Contact us at <a target="_blank" class="c-link" href="mailto:businessinsider@timesinternet.in">businessinsider@timesinternet.in</a>.

Simply Put: A Deposit Dilemma — What's the fuss about a crisis in Indian bank deposits? Are mutual fund investments to blame?

Over the past few months, there’s been a lot of brouhaha about the lagging pace of bank deposits in India. Simply put, the rate at which Indians are depositing their hard-earned money in banks has been falling constantly, and some blame the increasing financialization of household savings in the country, or the rising preference of Indians towards mutual funds and shares. So, the hypothesis is that people are choosing to invest more in mutual funds and the Indian equity markets through direct investments, IPOs, or NFOs, the money flowing into Indian banks in the form of deposits is slowing down. But is that really the case? <h2>A crisis or a phase?</h2><keyword id="19899808" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="rbi" source="keywords">RBI</keyword> data suggested that for the quarter ended June 2024, bank deposits grew at 11.7%. On the other hand, credit growth has outpaced this at 15%. This means that the outflow from banks as loans is far greater than the inflow into them in the form of deposits in Q1 of FY 2024-25. The situation largely saw cut-copy-paste in the first week of September as well, with loans registering a 13.3% YoY growth during the period, while deposits rose only 11.1%. This gap has only been widening for the last 3 years. Since deposits are how banks gather assets to further lend and earn interest income as a consequence, even a slight dip could set the alarm bells ringing for banks, and rightfully so. And truth be told, mutual funds are indeed taking on bank deposits in a big way. Per a report by <keyword id="20250971" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="franklin-templeton" source="keywords">Franklin Templeton</keyword>, in August 2024, the AUM (assets under management) of Indian mutual funds, or the total funds managed by them, stood at 31.3% of total bank deposits in the country, up from 24.20% during the year-ago period. As of August 2024, the AUM of mutual funds stood at Rs 66.17 lakh crore, an all-time high. But all said and done, is this really the reason why the rate of bank deposits is falling behind? SBI has dismissed this to be a “statistical myth”, and experts point out that since equity and fund houses also keep the cash in their respective bank accounts, there’s no cause for concern. So, is financialization really to be blamed for the trailing tempo of deposits? Or is something else happening behind the scenes? We take a closer look: <h2>First, are <keyword id="4000333" type="General" weightage="100" keywordseo="household-deposits" source="Orion">household deposits</keyword> really slowing down? And is that a cause of concern?</h2>Data from Motilal Oswal suggests the contrary. Deposits grew by around 10.4% between March 2020 and August 2024. Data from RBI also highlights that as of August 9, 2024, bank deposits witnessed a YoY growth of 10.8%. The loan-to-deposit ratio for the retail segment, which indicates what percentage of its total deposits the banks lend out as loans, has stayed at 77.5%, above the 77% mark for the tenth straight month. Also, we can’t forego the fact that the share of Indian <keyword id="20319599" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="households" source="keywords">households</keyword> in bank deposits has indeed slowed down. However, data from Axis AMC shows that the dip is marginal—from 63% in 2022 to 62% in 2023 and 61% in 2024. What has slowed down even more considerably is the share of government deposits in the aggregate bank deposits, which has dipped from 14% in 2018 to 9% in 2024. So, it's not just household deposits, you see. Moreover, as of March 2024, the collective CASA ratio (current and savings account deposits) of all commercial banks in India stood at 41.00%, down from 43.1% in March 2023 and 45.2% in March 2022, marking a nearly 5% point decline over the past year, while still staying over the 10-year average of 39.2%. This implies that Indian banks are relying more on higher-cost funds (savings accounts), which can limit their profitability. <h2>What is this financialisation of savings we are talking about?</h2>Then again, there is no doubt about the growing affinity of Indians towards mutual funds and stock markets. Recent data from CBDT (<keyword id="19942037" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="central-board-of-direct-taxes" source="keywords">Central Board of Direct Taxes</keyword>) highlights that India’s net direct tax collection surged by around 22%, driven exclusively by the significant uptick in the collection of <keyword id="20930760" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="securities-transaction-tax" source="keywords">Securities Transaction Tax</keyword> (STT), which doubled to Rs 26,154 crore, from Rs 13,352 crore in the year-ago period. Why does this matter? STT is levied when you buy or sell equity shares on stock exchanges, sell equity mutual funds, and trade in futures and options in the equity segment. Such taxes, including the multiple other taxes in equity market investments, are considered as leakages as the money moves out of the economy into government coffers. Data from a ValueQuest report explains that over the last 20 years, the markets have handsomely rewarded the investors, generating over $900 billion in incremental value for them. This is the major driver behind the dramatic rise in investment flowing towards the equity markets. There’s further proof of this budding romance, if you check the demat pudding. The number of demat accounts, which are a primary requisite for participating in the stock markets, also burgeoned by 42.3 lakh in August 2024, taking India’s total tally of demat accounts beyond 17 crore. To put this in perspective, this is almost equivalent to the population of just 8 nations in the world, including China, the US, Brazil and more. Vivek Iyer, Partner, Grant Thornton Bharat thinks it's rather important, as well. “Financialisation of household savings in India is an indication of deepening capital markets in the market, especially from a retail investor standpoint. Bank deposits with a modest rate of return are no longer the only option for savings for investors. Investors today have more avenues for wealth creation in the form of public capital markets, which have democratized wealth creation and provided equality of opportunity to retail investors”, he says. Yes, Indians are investing more and more in the markets, and in mutual funds. But is it a sin to look out for inflation-beating returns, which the stock markets offer, and vanilla bank deposits don't? After all, the allure of 12-13% annual returns offered by equities can certainly pale the stability offered by good old deposits, which generally do not go beyond 9% when it comes to annual returns. But all of this is not what is behind the slowdown. India is still a toddler in the school of savings financialization, with less than 10% of the population holding a demat account, and less than 5% of us saving in equities. That's a drop in the ocean of deposits, far inadequate to trigger a tsunami. <h2>Tell me why lagging deposits have nothing to do with Indians investing more in mutual funds!</h2>Says Shweta Rajani, Head - Mutual Funds, Anand Rathi Wealth Limited, “Households' equity holdings composition grew from 11.1% in FY 23 to 14.7% in FY 24. This trend reflects a growing awareness of investment options, empowering individuals to take control of their financial futures. Despite this transition towards equities, banks still hold a significant share of household financial savings—33.5% in FY24 compared to 34.9% in FY23”. Also, household savings and their subsequent financialization do not have much to do with deposit creation, which is entirely made by banks. What actually drives increased deposits is credit growth or increased lending. When interest rates are eased, people tend to borrow more and spend more, which circulates more money in the economy. For the past 4 years, RBI has been tightening the screws on interest rates, which raises the cost of borrowings, and makes it more expensive to take loans, putting a dampener on credit growth, but effectively curbing inflationary pressures. The last time RBI cut the repo rate by 40 basis points was back in May 2020, 4 years ago. The lag in deposit growth we’re witnessing is almost 3 years old. Coincidence much, or just good old economics at work? But with the <keyword id="19900043" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="fed" source="keywords">Fed</keyword> recently setting a rate cut precedent by slashing 50 bps off its interest rate, RBI is expected to follow suit in the next <keyword id="19918491" type="General" weightage="20" keywordseo="mpc" source="keywords">MPC</keyword> (Monetary Policy Committee) meeting, scheduled for November 2024. A rate cut would ease the aforementioned high cost of borrowing, and increase loan-taking for corporates and institutional investors, thereby stoking consumption in the economy. And then, deposit creation in banks is likely to return to its former glory. If not, then that would be a curious case to unravel! But that worry is for another day.

A Deposit Dilemma — What's the fuss about a crisis in Indian bank deposits? Are mutual fund investments to blame?

<ul class="summary-list"><li>Trump's civil fraud trial, which could run him and Trump Org out of NY, is in its second week.</li><li>On Wednesday, state officials called Nicholas Haigh, a former Deutsche Bank banker, to the stand.</li></ul>They called it the Trump "haircut."Really, that was what <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/trumps-secret-ugly-breakup-with-deutsche-bank-revealed-2022-10">Deutsche Bank – Donald Trump's most generous lender</a> – called the routine cuts they applied to whatever the former president told them he was worth.The "haircut" reference was made Wednesday <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/trumps-ny-fraud-trial-opens-today-heres-why-still-matters-2023-9">at Trump's New York civil fraud trial,</a> now mid-way through its second week. The word jumped out during an esoteric finance discussion."First of all, what is a haircut?" Kevin Wallace, an attorney for the AG's office, asked while questioning one of the former president's chief barbers, so to speak, Nicholas Haigh.Haigh is a banker who helped sign off on the more than $400 million that Deutsche Bank loaned the former president over the past decade."A haircut is a way by which the bank reduces the stated value of the asset in order to form some kind of assessment of what it might be worth," should there be a default, Haigh testified in a crisp British accent.Trump's pre- and post-haircut net worth varied wildly, the banker showed.In 2011, Trump told the bank he was worth $4.26 billion. But after the bank's haircut, meaning in a hypothetical default, he'd be worth as little as $2.365 billion, according to the fourth page of <a href="https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24026639-nyag-v-trump-2011-deutsche-bank-trump-credit-report" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Deutche Bank's 2011 Trump "credit report,"</a> an internal banking document entered into evidence in the morning.<h2>So what, in simpler terms, was a Trump haircut? </h2>The Trump haircut, then, was Deutsche Bank's way of taking Trump's very sunny assessments of his worth and using them to calculate what he'd be worth in a very worst-case scenario. If he defaulted on a loan, for example, then the bank might sell his properties in a down market, say, for golf courses.The term first surfaced nearly two years ago in a court filing by the attorney general's office that described how the bank took Trump's self-described net worth and used it to calculate their own separate, lower, "stress scenario" worth.In the lender's own internal paperwork, there was what Trump said he was worth in his annual Statements of Financial Condition. To the right, in a separate column, there was his "DB adjusted," which is Deutsche Bank's fire-sale price, calculated via a percentage "haircut."<div type="image" title="A table listing financial categories, what the client reported them as being worth, and what were worth after being &quot;DB adjusted.&quot; they" height="650" width="1208" msid="104352743" hostid="261"></div>Trump's post-haircut worth was critical, over the years, in evaluating "whether to extend or maintain credit," the AG's filing said. The calculation influenced the bank's decision to lend money to Trump and then continue to let him keep that money during the life of the loan. The loans helped build the Trump empire — and reputation — that, in turn, propelled him, as a billionaire businessman, to the White House.Deutsche Bank financed the Trump National Doral Miami golf resort (he borrowed $125 million), the Trump International Hotel &amp; Tower in Chicago (he borrowed $107 million), and the renovation of the Old Post Office in Washington, DC (he borrowed $170 million).<div type="image" title="A view of a Trump hotel from the street." height="4133" width="5511" msid="104352744" hostid="261"></div><h2>Crew cut? Trim?</h2>That depends.A different haircut would be applied by Deutsche Bank depending on the kind of asset. For instance, the haircut on cash was very small since cash doesn't really depreciate, Haigh testified Wednesday.But the haircut on Trump's golf resorts? That was 50%, he testified.And in 2011, Deutsche Bank gave Trump a 75% haircut on what he said his Seven Springs estate in upstate New York was worth — because that valuation included the development of nine yet-unbuilt luxury "mansions." "Asset properties that are not yet developed have a larger range of possible impacts on their value" in the future, Haigh explained. <div type="image" title="An excerpt from Deutsche Bank's internal, 2011 Trump credit report, mentioning a 75 percent haircut." height="248" width="2500" msid="104352745" hostid="261"></div>That turned out to be a good call by Deutsche Bank. The nine mansions were essentially imaginary, the AG has argued, since zoning laws and other local regulations had already banned their construction, despite Eric Trump's efforts at the time."A haircut in banking is usually when they take a small percentage off the top," said Tammara Buckey, a Huntsville, Alabama-based CPA and career consultant who has been following the trial with an eye toward its potential for comedy – she won last year's South's Funniest Accountant competition."Usually it's just a trim," she said. "But for Trump it more resembled Britney Spears in 2007 – singing, "Ooops, I frauded again."<h2>And why do we care?</h2>It's a point of dispute in the trial. Trump's side says that the former president never defaulted and that Deutsche Bank made many millions off of his interest on the loans. They lent to him regardless of their most severe haircut calculations and were in no way victimized, his lawyers have argued.The attorney general counters that in lending to Trump, Deutsche Bank relied on both Trump's adjusted, worst-case, "haircut" worth and his self-reported worth. The state's expert witnesses are expected to testify that it's unlikely that the bank would have loaned to Trump at all if they knew those numbers were fraudulent.James has accused the defendants in her lawsuit — Trump, his two eldest sons, and two former long-standing executives — of conspiring to lie about his worth by as much as $3.6 billion a year in a decade's worth of the annual statements of financial condition he used to get and keep his loans.She's seeking to permanently ban him from running a business in New York, among other penalties, and has already won a pre-trial ruling that <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-fraud-ruling-corporate-death-penalty-for-his-empire-experts-2023-9">may shift control of the Trump Organization to a receiver</a> who'd be tasked with selling assets.Haigh's testimony was taken during a break in longer testimony by Allen Weisselberg, Trump's former CFO, who on Tuesday testified that Trump's <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/allen-weisselberg-testifies-tripling-square-footage-financial-reports-minor-mistake-2023-10">tripling of the square footage of his penthouse in five years of financial statements was a "minor" miscalculation</a>.

You Searched For "dhfl yes bank case" and got 6 results

Is the lending party over? The dangerous tango of Indian banks with microfinance and unsecured loans

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Simply Put: A Deposit Dilemma — What's the fuss about a crisis in Indian bank deposits? Are mutual fund investments to blame?

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A Deposit Dilemma — What's the fuss about a crisis in Indian bank deposits? Are mutual fund investments to blame?

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The Trump 'haircut': Yes, Deutsche Bank really used this term in reducing what Trump said he was worth

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