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<ul class="summary-list"><li>US Army Rangers and Nuclear Disablement Teams trained this summer to neutralize enemy nuclear sites.</li><li>The exercise reflects rising tensions with nuclear-armed nations and those pursuing such weapons.</li></ul>Over the summer, soldiers from the Army's little-known Nuclear Disablement Team linked up with the elite <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/best-ranger-competition-determines-us-militarys-best-2-man-team-2023-3">75th Ranger Regiment</a> at a training event that offered insight into how the US military is thinking about taking out enemy underground nuclear facilities in the event of a conflict.The drill came as the US grapples with rising tensions with <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/china-now-fastest-growing-nuclear-arsenal-in-the-world-report-2024-6">China</a>, <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/israel-not-able-to-take-down-iran-nuclear-sites-own-2024-10">Iran</a>, <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-tells-united-nations-accelerate-nuclear-weapons-program-2024-11">North Korea</a>, and <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/putin-menaced-west-nuclear-war-troops-ukraine-russia-nato-strike-2024-2">Russia</a>, three of which already possess nuclear weapons and one that is, as far as the US is concerned, a little too close for comfort.<h2 id="09f50434-2cc2-41e9-82da-664371144da4">Rangers taking down nuke sites</h2>For decades, taking down adversary nuclear facilities has been a concern for the US military. No one wants to think about a near-peer conflict because of the specter of nuclear war that such a conflict could bring, but militaries regularly prepare for a wide range of scenarios that might never happen.Ranger training to prosecute nuclear targets seems to signal a shift in their role. For decades, the mission to find and eliminate enemy nuclear facilities belonged to the secretive Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and its tier 1 special missions units. The Army's Delta Force was primarily tasked with finding ways to penetrate highly guarded nuclear facilities and neutralize nuclear warheads."The Unit [Delta Force] has been involved with the mission set. It is an extremely difficult task that incorporates a wide range of skill sets like CQB [close quarters battle], breaching, and CBRN [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear warfare]," a retired Delta Force operator told Business Insider."The fact that Rangers and SF [Army Special Forces] are getting involved in the mission set tells me that the military is getting ready for a fight where there might be several different nuclear sites that need to be secured," said the retired Delta Force operator, who talked on the condition of anonymity because of his ongoing work with the Department of Defense.The exercise in June saw <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/every-piece-gear-army-ranger-night-raid-bag-2023-5">Rangers</a> and Nuclear Disablement Team soldiers operating under simulated fire at a decommissioned pulse radiation facility.<div type="image" title="US Army Nuclear Disablement Team soldiers and Army Rangers moving out of a defunct facility." height="1365" width="2048" msid="115056615" hostid="261" sizebytes="142680"></div>"The highlight of the exercise was the integration of the NDTs and 75th Ranger Regiment teams," Army Maj. Aaron J. Heffelfinger, the team chief for Nuclear Disablement Team 1, said following the exercise, adding that the training "ensured that if we train together or respond to a real-world crisis in the future the teams are already familiar with each other's capabilities."Although the training was intended to simulate attacking an adversary nuclear facility overseas, recapturing a friendly nuclear facility captured by enemy forces or even terrorists at home is also a concern. There are a number of legal concerns surrounding a potential response in that particular nightmare scenario, but there are workarounds.The Army's Nuclear Disablement Teams, which handle weapons of mass destruction and related materials to deny their availability to adversaries, also work with federal agencies like the FBI as part of a task force trained and equipped to conduct nuclear forensics, and during the summer, the Army unit also worked with Green Berets from the 7th Special Forces Group on taking down nuclear facilities.<h2 id="a216d71f-b1b1-4c6b-8cfc-992649b9e2d0">A new kind of mission for the Rangers</h2>The 75th Ranger Regiment is the world's premier light infantry, <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-tell-the-us-militarys-most-elite-special-operators">special operations unit</a>. Comprised of three line infantry battalions, an intelligence battalion, and a special troops battalion, the 75th Ranger Regiment is America's answer to difficult situations that require raw force, numbers, and violence of action, the latter involving unrestricted speed, strength, surprise, and aggression.<div type="image" title="A US Army soldier in combat kit conducts operations next to a red light. The exact action is unclear." height="1151" width="2048" msid="115056614" hostid="261" sizebytes="56618"></div>Military commanders and planners have long recognized the value and effectiveness of the unit. In December 2020, the unit achieved a remarkable 7,000 days in continuous combat.Today, the 75th Ranger Regiment is a vastly different organization than it was 20 or 30 years ago. For years, the Rangers were limited to capturing airfields and pulling security for Delta Force. as they did during the <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/former-delta-force-members-remember-somalia-black-hawk-down-mission-2021-8">Black Hawk Down incident</a> in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993.But the demands of the Global War on Terror across the force opened the way for the 75th Ranger Regiment to take on more missions. Rangers in Iraq and Afghanistan went after the same high-value targets as Delta Force and SEAL Team 6. And now, they have taken on another strategic mission set, responding to the nuclear threat.

US Army Rangers have been training for a different kind of fight: neutralizing enemy underground nuclear facilities

<ul class="summary-list"><li>The Ukraine war raises a difficult question: Can armies maneuver to win anymore?</li><li>Artillery, mines, and drones are so costly they risk exhausting an offensive before a breakthrough. </li></ul>"Firepower kills," warned the French General Philippe Pétain just prior to the First World War. He worried that the would-be Napoleons of 1914, who dreamed of sweeping maneuvers and crushing victories, ignored a crucial possibility: that troops moving in the open would be <a target="_blank" href="https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Marshal+Petain+Understood+It+All%3A+Firepower+Kills.-a076736954">mown down</a> by artillery and machine guns.Pétain was proved right: firepower became so lethal that the armies of World War I dug deeply into the earth just to survive, until new weapons — notably the tank — broke the trench deadlock. But a century later, warfare has come full circle: drones, artillery and guided munitions have made movement so hazardous that both armies in Ukraine have reverted to trench warfare. Even Ukrainian forces in the recent <a target="_blank" href="https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-kursk-offensive-500-square-miles-russia-kyiv-1944894">Kursk offensive</a>, which used mechanized maneuver to seize nearly 500 miles of Russian territory, are now <a target="_blank" href="https://www.kyivpost.com/post/37252">digging in</a>.Whether in 1914 or 2024, there is a downside to a firepower-centric strategy: it tends to lead toward indecisive battles of attrition. Firepower can sweep the ground, but it can't occupy it. At some point, victory requires offensive maneuver to encircle opposing forces and sever supply lines.But is a maneuver strategy even possible anymore?A US think tank believes it has a solution for Ukraine as well as better armed Western militaries. By temporarily suppressing the defensive drone-artillery combo that has proven so devastating in the Russo-Ukraine War, armies can again maneuver to defeat their enemies."This task is feasible," argues the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/ukraine-and-problem-restoring-maneuver-contemporary-war">report</a> by the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War."It requires imagination, innovation, and iteration. It requires experimentation with battlefield concepts as well as with technology and tactics."ISW sees three problems with trying to maneuver in Ukraine, lessons that broadly apply to modern battlefields. First, Ukraine and Russia field armies large enough to cover the front without leaving gaps or open flanks, which means that an attacker usually has to assault through fortified lines (the study was written prior to Ukraine's thrust across the little-defended Russian border into Kursk). But drones, artillery, mines and other weapons have made penetrating enemy defenses <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/how-the-ukrainian-counteroffensive-ran-into-trouble-2023-11">so costly</a> that the attacker becomes too exhausted to exploit a breakthrough. And even if the attacker can punch a hole, the defender usually has enough resources to build fortified positions, sealing off the penetration and forcing the attacker to repeat the process.<div type="image" title="Artillery and machine guns were so deadly in World War I that armies fought from trenches." height="1516" width="2000" msid="113785279" hostid="261" sizebytes="584080"></div>This exactly describes the situation on the First World War's Western Front, a comparison <a target="_blank" href="https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/11/01/the-commander-in-chief-of-ukraines-armed-forces-on-how-to-win-the-war">made</a> by Ukraine's top general after the 2023 counter-offensive. But modern technology has added a new twist: drones and guided munition in what ISW calls — based on a Cold War-era Soviet concept — the "tactical reconnaissance strike complex.""The TRSC is the combination of pervasive tactical reconnaissance, primarily by drone; drone-corrected precision artillery fire; precision munitions delivered by fixed- and/or rotary-wing aircraft; drone-launched precision munitions; and large numbers of FPV [first-person view] loitering munitions," ISW explained. While both the attacker and defender can use the TRSC, it is the attacker who must break cover and expose himself in the open.In this conception, the TRSC is dynamic, a cat-and-mouse game where each side seeks to jam the links between enemy drones and their operators, while constantly updating their own drone systems to beat jamming. For Ukraine — or the US — to launch successful ground offensives, it will need to exploit "fleeting technological advantages to disrupt the defender's TRSC in support of the initial penetration operation and to sustain the advantage long enough to create a moving envelope that protects exploitation forces through to their planned culmination and transition to the defensive having secured their objectives."In other words, the assault force needs to be protected by jammers and air defenses as it rumbles a path through the enemy's defenses.Some Western experts advocate the creation of mobile <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/us-armys-rapid-maneuver-may-be-over-2024-4">"bubbles"</a> in which troops would safely move under the protection of jammers, anti-drone weapons and other defensive systems. "The requirement is not to destroy them [drones] permanently or universally," the ISW report said. "Temporarily suppressing the local TRSC will require combining the EW [electronic warfare] and other counter-drone capabilities described above with effective counter-battery fire and other capabilities to suppress traditional artillery alongside effective tactical air defense against fixed- and rotary-wing attack aviation in pre-determined sectors to permit the concentration first of penetration and then of exploitation forces."However, the attacker must also take care that it only disrupts enemy drones, and not friendly ones as well. "EW systems must thus be designed and operated in a way that does not suppress all drone activity in the attack sector," ISW noted. That's still a work in progress for Ukraine, which also lacks the advanced EW disruptors that can defend wide areas of the battlefield.The debate over whether armies can still maneuver also turns on a capability hardly available to Ukraine: fighter jets that provide close air support. Its new <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-long-range-glide-bombs-gives-f-16s-new-punch-2024-9">F-16s</a> are mostly flying far from the front to avoid the Russian surface-to-air missile batteries that have gutted its air force. In contrast, debates about the US Army's ability to maneuver may turn on questions about the effectiveness of its attack helicopters and Air Force planes like the A-10 Thunderbolt and the AC-130 Ghostrider.Ukraine may be able to compensate for its lack of airpower by using drones and <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/interactive-map-shows-russian-targets-ukraine-could-hit-with-atacms-2024-8">ground-launched long-range rockets</a> to perform close air support, as well as battlefield air interdiction to hit Russian reinforcements and supply columns just behind the front line and isolate the defenders. "Ukrainian forces will have to find ways to use the drone and missile strike systems it has to generate the effects of BAI and CAS in direct support of the penetration battle and the exploitation phase of each offensive operation," ISW said.Even though Ukrainian forces are outnumbered by the Russians, Ukraine can also use shrewd tactics to restore maneuver warfare, ISW contends. For example, Ukrainian forces can judge the "culminating point" of Russian offensives, when the attack begins to run out of steam and the attacker is vulnerable to a sharp, well-timed counterattack. Such a <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-military-shifts-active-defensive-failed-nazi-germany-wwii-2024-2">"backhand blow"</a> strategy was used with some success by German mechanized forces to stop Soviet offensives in World War II, though ultimately the panzer divisions were worn down.Regardless of whether ISW's concept is viable, the cyclical pattern of military history suggests that the luster of firepower will eventually fade, and maneuver will once again become ascendant. "The long history of war makes clear that maneuver will ultimately be restored to the battlefield despite the current challenges," ISW concluded.Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.twitter.com/@mipeck1">Twitter</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mipeck/">LinkedIn</a>.

Armies will be able to maneuver on battlefields again, but it's going to be difficult and bloody 

<ul class="summary-list"><li>North Korea is copying the American Hellfire missile, US Army Brig. Gen. Patrick Costello said.</li><li>Pyongyang previously unveiled two drones that looked suspiciously like the MQ-9 Reaper and RQ-4 Global Hawk.</li></ul>The US military is closely watching a new North Korean drone that uses a "reverse-engineered copy" of the Hellfire missile for the MQ-9 Reaper and RQ-4 Global Hawk, a US Army general said on Tuesday."North Korea recently unveiled a reconnaissance and multirole UAV that employ a reverse-engineered copy of a Hellfire missile, similar to an RQ-4 and MQ-9," Brig. Gen. Patrick Costello said at the 2024 Association of the United States Army Conference.Costello, who oversees US missile and air defense in the Indo-Pacific, said <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/south-korea-speed-up-stealth-drones-after-north-drone-flights-2022-12">Pyongyang</a> has been primarily developing drones in Groups 1 to 3, or those weighing about 1,320 pounds or less."As we watch all the relationships that are building in all the conflicts around the world, that's one that we are watching very closely," Costello added.Costello was likely referring to a pair of drones displayed by North Korea in July 2023, which <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-displays-new-aircraft-look-like-us-military-drones-2023-7">looked nearly identical</a> to the MQ-9 Reaper and RQ-4 Global Hawk, two of the most advanced UAVs in the US military.Pyongyang's state media said at the time that the drones were "newly developed" and released footage of one <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://x.com/nknewsorg/status/1684448601123217409">firing missiles</a>, which drew comparisons in the West to the Hellfire guided munitions used by the American systems.<div type="image" title="This photo provided by the North Korean government, shows what it says attack drones during a military parade to mark the 70th anniversary of the armistice that halted fighting in the 1950-53 Korean War, on Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea Thursday, July 27, 2023." height="3333" width="5000" msid="114272420" hostid="261" sizebytes="476394"></div>The exact capabilities of these drones and their munitions are still unclear. If the North Korean missiles are, indeed, guided, it's also unknown what system they employ.Costello's remarks now indicate a US military assessment that the drones were at least built with some knowledge of American hardware.The brigadier general's remarks were part of a presentation on unmanned threats in the Indo-Pacific as US military leaders spoke of a need to better prepare for drone warfare, especially given the rise of small UAVs in recent conflicts such as the Ukraine war."We're certainly seeing, regardless of the theater, that this contested environment is really just a matter of fact," said Maj. Gen. David Stewart, director of the Joint Counter-UAS Office.The Defense Department has <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/FY2025/FY2025_Weapons.pdf">requested</a> a budget of $2.4 billion for unmanned aircraft systems in the 2025 fiscal year ending September 30. However, various US military branches still hope to acquire more funds for such technology.The unfunded wish list for the US Army alone included <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2024/03/army-puts-drones-front-and-center-newly-obtained-budget-docs/395182/">some $741 million</a> for counter-drone systems and air defense this fiscal year.The drone industry is also facilitating the rise of new defense contractors, like <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/who-is-palmer-luckey#:~:text=Palmer%20Luckey%20founded%20the%20virtual,defense%2Dtech%20startup%20Anduril%20Industries.">Palmer Luckey</a>'s Anduril, which is running a <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://thedefensepost.com/2022/01/26/us-special-ops-counter-drone-contract/">10-year deal worth $1 billion</a> with US Special Operations Command for counter-drone tech.Earlier this month, the Pentagon awarded the startup another <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2024/10/08/anduril-lands-250-million-pentagon-contract-for-drone-defense-system/">$250 million contract</a> for 500 of the firm's reusable Roadrunner drones and its pulsar jammer technology.The US Army and 94th AAMDC's public affairs teams did not respond to requests for comment sent outside regular business hours by Business Insider.

North Korea's new drones use a 'reverse-engineered copy' of Hellfire missiles from the MQ-9 Reaper, US Army general says

AeroVironment's Switchblade drones are the US Army's latest big bet. See the small but mighty munitions in action.

<ul class="summary-list"><li>Russia's response to Ukraine's invasion of Kursk has been a bit of a mess.</li><li>The Kremlin didn't mount a large military response and instead called on units unlikely to mix well.</li></ul>Russia's jumbled response to <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/kursk-battle-ukraine-russia-war-strategy-2024-8">Ukraine's invasion of its Kursk region</a> indicates that its military is still suffering from a critical weakness, warfare experts told Business Insider.Ukraine launched an incursion into Kursk on August 6 and by Tuesday had taken almost 500 square miles of territory, according to the country's army chief. That's <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-captured-more-territory-kursk-than-russia-seized-ukraine-year-2024-8">more territory than Russia has managed to take in Ukraine this year</a>.The development has been humiliating for Russia, according to George Barros, a Russia analyst at Washington DC-based think tank the Institute for the Study of War.He said Russia's response only compounds that, highlighting a longstanding issue with command and control with which Russia has struggled.<h2 id="fe5e8c0e-cf3f-4940-bc02-91699388dfd3">Bungling the Kursk response</h2>Russia's late response to Ukraine's attack was to put the FSB — Russia's primary security and intelligence agency — in charge of a host of other groups.The move indicates Russia has a "very unorthodox, untested command and control structure that's going to be responding to this," Barros said. Russia has for a long time had issues with command and control, which is key to directing military, security, and emergency response forces effectively.<div type="image" title="The back view of a figure in a green camouflage jacket and helmet looking at a damaged apartment building" height="1334" width="2000" msid="112922399" hostid="261" sizebytes="437724"></div>He noted that even in its invasion of Ukraine, which was planned in advance and where its military forces are organized in "a very conventional and orthodox way," Russia's command and control has been "horrific and very ineffective."Russia has faced criticized for its poor command and control structures, which often see it refuse to delegate responsibility like Western armies do, resulting in a slow and immobile force.The problem has been on display throughout the war in Ukraine, where the Russians have been slow to react to combat developments and even <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/himars-ukraine-perfect-weapon-exploit-russia-bad-logistics-expert-2022-7">brought many commanders close to the fighting, where they were then killed</a>.Warfare experts have repeatedly <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-ill-fated-invasion-ukraine-lessons-modern-warfare">pointed</a> to critical command and control problems as to why Russia's ground forces did not make good progress at the beginning of <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/why-did-russia-invade-ukraine-putin-politics-motive-2023-6">its invasion</a>.And now, in Kursk, Barros said, "with this even more convoluted situation that they're going into, I have remained very skeptical of the Russian's ability to effectively marshal all these disparate forces. And I think it bodes poorly for the effectiveness of the Russian response.'"Rajan Menon, a senior research scholar at Columbia University's Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, said Ukraine has been able to take advantage of Russia's shortcomings by fighting differently."The Russians have a very centralized conception of warfare," he said, adding that "the Ukrainians have delegated a lot of authority to local commanders, and they have highly mobile troops operating on multiple fronts."And "it's been a very difficult thing for the Russians to figure it out because they didn't expect anything like this," he said.While it's unclear how this complex scenario will end, Menon said he thinks "the key point to bear in mind is the very fact that this could have happened at all. This is astonishing."<h2 id="95bb003d-9722-4ece-9a06-eb2b5c352eb8">A slow and complicated reaction</h2>Reports have suggested Russia's high command <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/kursk-ukraine-exploited-russias-dysfunctional-military-command-2024-8">ignored intelligence </a>about a Ukrainian troop buildup. Ukrainian troops said they were <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-soldier-russia-troops-kursk-kids-mandatory-service-wsj-2024-8">able to enter Kursk easily</a>, and warfare experts said Ukraine was able to<a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/kursk-ukraine-exploited-russias-dysfunctional-military-command-2024-8"> take advantage of dysfunction in Russian military leadership</a>.<div type="image" title="A still from a video shows a soldier on the ground supporting another soldier standing on a ridge in the side of a building holding a Ukrainian flag in the air" height="1000" width="2000" msid="112922400" hostid="261" sizebytes="37236"></div>Barros noted that Russia's response "did not happen right away. It took many days."That early reaction was small and involved inexperienced troops, which did little to slow Ukraine down. Russian President Vladimir Putin took days to announce a military response.Menon said Putin appeared to have been "caught completely flatfooted." He described Russia's response as "some combination of arrogance and incompetence rolled into one."That eventual response was the FSB being put in charge, with involvement from Rosgvardia (Russia's national guard), some troops redeployed from Ukraine, conscripts, and special forces troops.ISW said in an update on August 20 that <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-struggling-ukraine-kursk-chaotic-command-isw-military-invasion-2024-8">Russia's response to the invasion of Kursk was being hampered</a> because of "complex and overlapping responsibilities and the seemingly ever-growing list of actors the Kremlin has tasked with responding to the Ukrainian incursion."<div type="image" title="A destroyed tank on top of mud and a green field under a blue cloudy sky" height="1333" width="2000" msid="112922403" hostid="261" sizebytes="519770"></div>Barros said that putting the FSB in charge was "pretty surprising" and said it would make more sense for the army to be in charge.He said the FSB "doesn't have it in its mandate, nor does it have the experience of creating a joint headquarters for responding to a large-scale adversary combined arms operation."Trying to get so many different groups to work together will be a challenge for it, Barros said. He said that the FSB will likely have "a very challenging time working out the command and control for all of the disparate different cats and dogs that are being cobbled together to respond to the Ukrainian incursion."Barros said that the different groups don't all have a history "in dealing with combined arms operations. They don't have a history of working together at scale in this sort of context." He added that "many of them don't have it in their capabilities or mission to be able to do the kind of attack that the Ukrainians are putting forward."Even with Russia's response in action, Ukraine's troops are still advancing into Kursk, although at a much slower rate as resistance builds, even amid Russia's poor reaction.<h2 id="de7f9b00-b2dc-4feb-9f99-332f8a489daf">Russia is downplaying</h2>Putin, meanwhile, is downplaying Ukraine's invasion, describing it as a terrorist attack.<div type="image" title="Four men in suits sit around the end of a rectangular black table with a cream wall, a coat of arms, and the Russian flag behind them" height="1333" width="2000" msid="112922404" hostid="261" sizebytes="93812"></div>Barros said that Putin has not taken a stronger step, like declaring martial law, as he wants to minimize political risk to himself. Throughout Putin's invasion, which began in February 2022, Putin has repeatedly made "militarily stupid" decisions for political reasons, he said.He argued that taking stronger action "would do great damage to Putin's decades-long strategic effort to basically rebuild Russia's prestige, put forward the narrative that under Putin's leadership, Russia has become sort of another great world power."Instead, he is downplaying it instead of "admitting that this is the "first foreign military operation within Russian soil since World War II," an obviously serious development.Putin wanted to "maintain the desired PR optics of everything's fine, everything's under control, we're not going to mobilize the population," Barros said.And that has been a common trend. Russia has not conducted a large-scale mobilization since late 2022, and that round was met with <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russians-fleeing-putin-ukraine-mobilization-face-traffic-expensive-flights-prison-2022-9">thousands of young Russians fleeing the country</a>. The UK Ministry of Defence said last year that the <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-no-big-troop-mobilization-before-putin-election-uk-intel-2023-10">Kremlin was aware such a move is unpopular</a> and could have political consequences.Despite the mess in Kursk, Russia is still pushing forward and gaining territory in Ukraine's east. For now, it has been reluctant to pull many troops from those areas.

Russia's messy response to Ukraine's invasion is telling about the weaknesses still plaguing its army

<ul class="summary-list"><li>Many NATO armies may not be prepared for large-scale urban warfare.</li><li>Israel's operation in Gaza is a test-case for what they may need.</li></ul>Urban warfare in Gaza has revealed a painful truth for NATO: Many of its armies are ill-prepared for fighting in crowded cities.The Israel Defense Forces has achieved some success in adapting new weapons and tactics, such as arming tactical units with missiles and drones rather than relying support from aircraft and artillery, according to a new British study. The problem is that the British Army lacks the equipment to replicate Israeli tactics."While British troops may be trained to fight like the IDF, they find themselves equipped to die like Hamas," warned the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/tactical-lessons-israel-defense-forces-operations-gaza-2023">report</a> by the Royal United Services Institute, a British think tank.The <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/british-army-size-smallest-since-napoleonic-wars-2024-7">British Army</a> is understrength, underequipped and underfunded. But so are many European armies that dwindled after the end of the Cold War. Even some American experts worry about the city-fighting capabilities of the <a target="_blank" href="https://warontherocks.com/2023/12/learning-from-real-wars-gaza-and-ukraine/">US Army</a>, which is far more lavishly equipped and supplied than its NATO counterparts. There is good reason for concern: urban warfare has become a fixture of warfare on a rapidly urbanizing planet, from <a target="_blank" href="https://mwi.westpoint.edu/urban-warfare-case-study-6-first-battle-of-fallujah/">Fallujah</a> in 2003 to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/bakhmut-how-ukraine-lost-city-russia-won-hollow-victory-2023-12">Bakhmut</a> in 2023.So it's natural for NATO armies to study how the IDF — a NATO-style mechanized force with a reputation for innovative tactics and high-tech equipment — is battling Hamas among the labyrinthine streets and high-rises of Gaza. Like Western militaries, the last place the IDF wants to fight is in a city, where buildings and rubble shelter the defender, impede armored vehicles and hamper airpower and artillery. Gaza poses an added challenge: <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/israel-invasion-gaza-hamas-hardest-fighting-underground-tunnels-warfare-2023-10">a vast tunnel network</a> that Hamas uses for storing weapons and springing hit-and-run attacks.Indeed, Israel even coined a term for this form of combat: "<a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/israeli-troops-struggled-to-fight-through-gaza-sections-reduced-rubble-2024-7">Devastated terrain warfare</a>." Israel's aerial barrage reduced many neighborhoods to rubble before ground forces moved in and is the leading cause of the 39,000 reported Palestinian fatalities. It is a challenging environment for Israel in particular, a small nation of 10 million people that is sensitive to casualties among its soldiers, the majority of whom are reservists.<div type="image" title="Israeli troops and their vehicles have faced challenges operating in sections of Gaza that the Israeli Air Force shattered." height="1342" width="2000" msid="112424687" hostid="261" sizebytes="269204"></div>One tactic that proved effective was to give the lower echelon units — such as platoons — small attack <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/armies-need-their-own-drone-air-force-flown-by-specialists-study-says-2024-5">drones</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/anti-tank-missiles-armor-ukraine-tank-still-has-battlefield-role-2023-10">anti-tank missiles</a>. "It was discovered that units that had these systems as well as ATGMs [anti-tank guided missiles] could monitor more urban terrain and conduct precision strikes at tempo in support of tactical actions," RUSI said. "The small size of the munitions used meant that they could be used with an expectation of precision."With Hamas hiding in and raiding from an estimated 450 miles of concrete tunnels, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/israel-uses-yahalom-unit-when-it-needs-to-fight-underground-2023-11">the IDF</a> also found that it couldn't clear buildings first and then destroy the tunnels underneath. "As the operation developed, it became evident that this allowed Hamas to persist in conducting ambushes for a protracted period and to then transition to a layered defense of underground facilities," noted RUSI analysts Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, who co-authored the report. "Nor could underground infrastructure be safely bypassed." This meant that Israeli troops had to clear the surface and tunnels simultaneously.Surprisingly, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/israel-pounding-gaza-massive-spice-kit-bombs-2023-12">the high-rise buildings</a> of Gaza proved less beneficial to Hamas than anticipated. Fighters stationed in the upper stories had limited visibility and fields of fire, so the tendency was to stick to the first few levels. But tall buildings did help the defender in another way: destroying them with air strikes led to extensive rubble that hampered the attacker's tanks and infantry.The biggest lesson of Gaza is the importance of firepower in urban warfare, according to RUSI. This makes arming tactical units, such as infantry platoons, with as much firepower as possible. Unlike mechanized operations, where low-level infantry and armored units might get air and artillery support from higher headquarters, city fighting tends to be waged by small units.Firepower played a decisive role "in determining initiative during the fighting in Gaza," RUSI said. "Ultimately, the superiority in responsiveness and organic lethality of IDF units made it costly for Hamas to mount attacks, and the larger the force it endeavored to bring to bear, the higher the cost of any given action. Furthermore, while indirect fire prevented Hamas from concentrating its forces, the limited organic lethality of its teams meant that once they engaged IDF troops, they were quickly suppressed and thereafter destroyed."Another lesson is the importance of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/see-israel-defense-systems-weapons-in-action-2024-4">air defense</a>. "Buildings do not offer significant protection against air-delivered munitions because of the weight of ordnance that can be dropped with precision," the report pointed out.Airpower also hampers maneuver, a major handicap for armies that usually lack the strength to occupy an entire city, and thus have to redeploy troops to key sectors. "Hamas's lack of ability to threaten Israeli aircraft and ISR [aerial reconnaissance] meant that it was unable to concentrate and lacked freedom of maneuver," said RUSI. "Once its defensive strong points were identified, they could be reduced. The weight of munitions deliverable from the air outweighs anything deliverable from artillery systems, such that many of the defensive advantages of urban terrain can be bypassed if it is possible to conduct precision bombing from medium altitude."In other words, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-israel-trying-to-achieve-in-gaza-bombing-2023-12">aerial bombing</a> from this altitude is accurate and high volume enough to destroy most urban strongholds or render them useless.This phenomenon has been seen in Ukraine, said Watling and Reynolds, who have extensively studied that conflict. "Whenever the Russian air force has established access at medium altitude near an urban settlement, it has rapidly destroyed it, enabling subsequent capture."However, the lessons of Israeli operations are not always applicable to other conflicts. For example, unlike Russia, Hamas has no artillery, nor electronic warfare to jam Israeli drones and communications, RUSI said. Hamas also only had 40,000 fighters at the war's start, many of whom are now casualties.Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.twitter.com/@mipeck1">Twitter</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mipeck/">LinkedIn</a>.

Israel's urban warfare tactics in Gaza offer lessons for NATO armies

<ul class="summary-list"><li>Ukraine's army chief said Kyiv invaded Kursk before Russia could launch a new attack from there.</li><li>Oleksandr Syrskyi told CNN the incursion forced Russia to redeploy forces and stopped its advances.</li></ul>Ukraine's army chief said Russia had planned to launch a new cross-border attack from Kursk, but Kyiv got there first.Ukraine caught Russia off guard by launching an incursion into Russia's Kursk region on August 6, grabbing hundreds of miles of territory in just a matter of days.Ukraine's Kursk incursion "reduced the threat of an enemy offensive," Ukraine's Commander-in-Chief, Col. Gen. Oleksandr Syrskyi, told <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/09/05/europe/ukraine-army-chief-kursk-incursion-exclusive-intl/index.html">CNN</a>. "We prevented them from acting."Syrskyi made the statement from an undisclosed location near the front lines of the fighting.He <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-captured-hundreds-square-miles-russian-territory-general-2024-8">said</a> that in under a week, Ukrainian forces had captured about 386 square miles — almost the equivalent of what Russia has captured in Ukraine this year.Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/u-vijni-nemaye-vidpustok-potribna-vchasna-logistika-ogoloshe-92661">said</a> last month that one of the operation's aims was to create a "buffer zone" to prevent further Russian attacks across the border.Syrskyi told CNN that the operation aimed to stop Russia from using Kursk as a springboard for a new offensive, and to force it into redeploying its military from other areas.According to Syrskyi, they have achieved these goals, forcing Russia to redeploy tens of thousands of soldiers — including airborne assault troops — to Kursk and stopping Russian advances in the city of Pokrovsk in eastern Ukraine."Over the last six days, the enemy hasn't advanced a single meter in the Pokrovsk direction," he said, adding that Ukrainian forces have reduced Russia's capacity to maneuver and send reinforcements."In other words, our strategy is working," he told CNN.Other goals being pursued, Syrskyi added, include preventing cross-border shelling of civilian objects, taking prisoners of war, and improving the morale of troops and the country.While Syrskyi said the offensive in Kursk had achieved some of its goals, it's unclear how long Ukraine can retain control of the territory it holds, and whether it can force Russia to redeploy enough of its troops away from the main 600-mile front line in eastern Ukraine.In an interview with <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/zelenskyy-ukraine-russia-territory-seized-putin-kursk-rcna169280">NBC News</a> on Tuesday, Zelenskyy said Ukraine is planning to hold the Russian land indefinitely as part of its victory plan, which he said he will present to the country's international allies this month.According to a <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-5-2024">report</a> by the Institute for the Study of War think tank on Thursday, Russian offensive operations in eastern Ukraine are likely to conclude earlier than its military anticipates due in part to operational challenges caused by Ukraine's incursion into Kursk.

Ukraine's army chief says Russia planned to launch a new attack from Kursk, but he got there first

<ul class="summary-list"><li>A new US Army unit is implementing lessons from Ukraine, Defense One reported.</li><li>It's testing new drone and electronic warfare tactics, the report said.</li></ul>In the battlefields of east Ukraine, drones and electronic warfare units have revolutionized combat, and the Pentagon is watching closely.<a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2024/08/army-puts-new-unit-loaded-cutting-edge-tech-test/398980/?oref=d1-homepage-top-story">According to Defense One, </a>a US Army unit, the 101st Airborne's Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company, has been tasked by US military chiefs with implementing lessons from the Ukraine.Defense One's reporter visited the unit in Fort Johnson, Louisiana.It is testing out new equipment and drawing up a new US military doctrine, the report said.Per Defense Onse, the unit is experimenting with new types of drones, counter-drone technology, electronic warfare, and other devices that could help modernize the US military."There's so many lessons to be able to take from [the Ukrainians], and a lot of it does come down to the integration of new things, like the proliferation of [drones]," Maj. Gen. Brett Sylvia, commander of the 101st Airborne Division, told the outlet.<a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/drone-swarms-how-emerging-tech-could-transform-future-wars-2024-3">In April, military analysts</a> told Business Insider that the Pentagon was keen to integrate lessons from Ukraine into its own military, with the impact of drones was among their focuses.The devices, which can cost as little as a few hundred dollars, have been used to devastating impact by Ukraine's military in its David-and-Goliath battle against the Kremlin's forces.They have been used to surveil enemy positions, fitted with explosives and used to attack enemy troops and armored vehicles, and even been used to <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-took-out-18m-russian-helicopter-using-cheap-drone-reports-2024-8">take out Russian helicopters.</a>It means large-scale troop gatherings have become highly dangerous, as they can be <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-troops-said-gathering-large-groups-getting-blown-up-isw-2024-2">rapidly spotted and attacked</a>.In response, the Kremlin has developed its own battlefield drone capability and bolstered electronic warfare units to scramble and disrupt the Ukrainian drones.It's resulted in a cat-and-mouse game, as both sides tweak and adapt drones to <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-russia-locked-cat-and-mouse-game-drone-production-official-2024-6">evade enemy defenses before electronic </a>warfare units can catch up.In February, <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2024/02/22/ukraine-war-pentagon-lessons-learned/">The Washington Post </a>reported that the Pentagon was revising its military playbook designed for wars with militant groups such as the Taliban to refocus on the possibility of a war with a major power such as Russia or China.It reported that a team of officials was closely studying the Ukraine conflict in areas including ground maneuver, airpower, and long-range fire capability for lessons to be incorporated into the new National Defense Strategy.Part of the review, it said, is figuring out how the US infantry can incorporate small drones into its units and counter the enemy's drones and capability to surveil and target its positions using electronic signals.According to the Defense One report, the Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company is experimenting with technology such as new drones that rapidly gather data, hand-held electronic warfare devices, and technology that mimics electronic signals and can be used to divert enemy fire.

A new US Army unit is taking pointers from Ukraine on drones and electronic warfare

<ul class="summary-list"><li>Drones have proven a menace to armored vehicles in Ukraine, including US-provided tanks.</li><li>The US Army is closely watching the drone war and teaching lessons to new soldiers in training.</li></ul>US-made armored vehicles in service with the Ukrainian military are up against an unfamiliar threat on the battlefield, one that they haven't faced in previous wars.Russia and Ukraine employ small drones strapped with explosives as a way to deliver cheap and effective precision strikes on enemy armor, often damaging or destroying them.The US Army is closely watching how US <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/bradley-fighting-vehicles-prove-worth-ukraine-short-on-abrams-tanks-2024-7">armored systems</a> delivered to Ukraine — specifically the M1 Abrams tank and M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle — are <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-abrams-tanks-keep-drones-away-need-more-protection-commander-2024-7">performing in combat</a> and holding up in this new type of warfare.It's also taking lessons from the conflict and applying them in training, teaching new soldiers how to grasp clearly the threat of small drones. Col. James Modlin, deputy commandant of the Army's Armor School, said that it's "important" for them to be able to understand the prevalence of small unmanned systems on future battlefields and that the fight is changing."It's really just recognizing that it's a threat — that this is something that's out there," he told Business Insider in a conversation this week. "You have to look up, you have to look 360" degrees.<div type="image" title="A Russian armored vehicle is on fire and damaged in a grassy field after it was hit by a Ukrainian drone." height="1534" width="2880" msid="112846965" hostid="261" sizebytes="150402"></div>The Armor School, a component of the Army's Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Moore in Georgia, is where US soldiers train on the fundamentals of becoming armored crew members. This means learning about what sort of threats they could face in future operating environments based on the situation unfolding across current battlefields.Paying attention to drone warfare is key when observing the Ukraine war. Modlin said new US soldiers training on Abrams or Bradleys aren't necessarily going to know whether they're facing a reconnaissance or combat drone. What's more important is knowing that it could be a threat either way and being able to relay that knowledge to leadership."There's a lot of unknowns out there," Modlin said, explaining that "for the privates, it's about increasing their situational awareness and their ability to recognize what is in the environment."<h2 id="1f42b776-63fa-4951-9a9e-5523bd50a9a1">New drones, new fight</h2>The US military has long used <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/rough-year-us-military-mq-9-reaper-drone-combat-recon-2023-11">larger drones</a> like the MQ-9 Reaper for surveillance and kinetic strikes.But around a decade ago, American forces in the Middle East started to face cheap, commercially available drones in combat, as the Islamic State weaponized these systems by strapping explosives to them and using them in attacks. Small drones also <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/drones-in-armenia-azerbaijan-war-raises-doubt-about-tanks-future-2020-11">later played a role</a> in the 2020 conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.<div type="image" title="A soldier climbing down from the front of a M1A1 Abrams tank." height="853" width="1280" msid="112847009" hostid="261" sizebytes="66962"></div>However, drone warfare has soared to new levels in Ukraine. Kyiv and Moscow have used these systems to <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/video-ukrainian-quadcopter-blows-up-russian-robot-rare-drone-combat-2024-4">carry out precision strikes</a> on enemy armor, personnel, fortifications, and even individual soldiers.Both sides have also developed countermeasures to protect their tanks and fighting vehicles from drones, such as welding <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-ukraine-welding-crude-cages-tanks-last-ditch-defense-effort-2023-7">crude-looking protective screens</a> to the exterior as a last-ditch defensive measure. The screens have become common and have even been <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ukrainian-operation-builds-cage-armor-protect-us-made-abrams-tanks-2024-6">fitted on US-provided armor</a> like the Abrams.Modlin said that Ukraine is a good example of how drones play a role in modern warfare, but the lessons that the Army is teaching its soldiers aren't solely focused on that specific conflict."When we look across all the emerging threat environments, that's a very similar challenge," he said. "The American Army really hasn't had to worry too much about enemy aircraft in an awfully long time — since my grandfather was in uniform.""It's something we've been talking about for a while, but now we're starting to see it play out a little bit more prevalent in conflicts," he added.<div type="image" title="A Bradley fighting vehicle firing from an entrenched position in a forest environment." height="3849" width="5774" msid="112846963" hostid="261" sizebytes="2148368"></div>Indeed, Israeli armored vehicles mobilized for the war in Gaza have been <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/17/israel-tanks-drone-protection-gaza/">outfitted with anti-drone protective screens</a> that are similar to the ones seen in Ukraine.Teaching US soldiers about the threat of drones to armored vehicles is just one way the Army is <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/us-military-isnt-ready-drones-potential-biggest-threat-next-battlefield-2024-5">increasingly incorporating anti-drone training</a> across the board. For instance, American service members are also learning how to<a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/us-troops-shoot-balloons-learn-to-defeat-dangerous-drone-threat-2024-3"> track and shoot down small drones</a> with handheld weapons and devices — which is a more mobile approach to the problem.When it comes to armored vehicle operations and combat, though, responding to drone warfare is just one area where the Army is evolving. Modlin said dozens of courses at the Maneuver Center of Excellence have been updated over the past few years based on observations from conflicts overseas.He said the Army is constantly looking to improve its training so that the next generation of leaders can be prepared for large-scale ground operations — something the US hasn't really seen in decades."Competence as an Army professional starts with the understanding of the threat, but it doesn't end there," Modlin said. "So we're paying really close attention to the lessons learned overseas — we're looking at what is happening around the world."

The US Army is telling its soldiers 'you have to look up' as it watches Abrams tanks face new threats in Ukraine

<ul class="summary-list"><li>The British Army is now smaller than those of Romania and Bangladesh.</li><li>Its size raises questions about the UK's ability to support NATO, confront Russia, or fight a war.</li></ul>What has happened to the redcoats that defeated Napoleon and helped win an empire that stretched across a quarter of the Earth's surface?The British Army has shrunk to its lowest level since the early 1800s. Years of relentless budget cutbacks have left it with just <a target="_blank" href="https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/05/30/army-falls-below-73000-first-time-since-napoleonic-area/">73,000 active-duty soldiers</a>. That's a far cry from the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/china-corruption-rocket-force-water-fuel-xi-jinping-purge-scandal-2024-1">Chinese army</a> of 2 million soldiers, Russia's 1.3 million, or the 460,000 active-duty troops of the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/us-armys-new-plan-russia-china-glaring-problem-crs-2024-5">US Army</a>.Britain's Army is now smaller than those of Romania and Bangladesh, and just slightly larger than those of Canada and Armenia. Until now, its <a target="_blank" href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a81d66740f0b623026996e1/2017-04440.pdf">lowest manpower level</a> over the last two centuries came in 1823, when it had just 72,000 soldiers. But that understates the current problem. Britain's population in 1823 was just over 20 million, versus around 67 million today. Adjusted for population, the British Army of 1823 would have around 225,000 soldiers today.This raises questions about the ability of Britain to support NATO, <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/putin-doesnt-want-nato-war-russia-would-lose-quickly-uk-2024-2">confront Russia</a>, or to engage in any major or long-term conflict. "As things stand, the British Army is a one-trick pony," Nicholas Drummond, a British defense expert and former infantry officer, told Business Insider. "It would deploy, fight for a maximum of six months, and then be fully depleted."The British Army has never had it easy. For centuries, it was the poorer cousin of the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/uk-navy-ships-breaking-down-britain-struggling-hms-queen-elizabeth-2024-2">Royal Navy</a>, which was seen as the guardian of an island nation and its empire. The writer Rudyard Kipling pointed out in poems like <a target="_blank" href="https://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poem/poems_tommy.htm">"Tommy"</a> that Britain doesn't support its army until there's a war:For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Chuck him out, the brute!"But it's "Savior of 'is country" when the guns begin to shoot;Thus the British Army's muster rolls have fluctuated depending on the world situation, and the perpetual parsimony of His Majesty's Treasury. In 1812, when it fought Napoleon and burned down Washington, DC, it had <a target="_blank" href="https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a81d66740f0b623026996e1/2017-04440.pdf">246,000 soldiers</a>. In 1918, it ended the First World War with 3.8 million personnel, and 2.9 million in 1945.In 1989, the British Army had 156,000 soldiers, or more than twice its present size. Like many armies after the end of the Cold War, it was downsized due to a perceived lack of need, difficulties in recruiting soldiers, and the belief that precision-guided weapons meant fewer boots on the ground.However, the shocking casualties and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/uk-learning-ukraine-russia-new-focus-trench-war-training-2024-2">trench warfare in the Ukraine</a> conflict suggest that future wars will be attritional, with victory going to the nations that have the most stamina, industrial might and resources to sustain losses. Yet with just 28,000 Army reservists, Britain lacks manpower to flesh out undermanned units in wartime, or to replace losses. Even the Army's current two combat divisions aren't fully capable."Right now, the British Army cannot generate a single division, let alone two," Drummond said."It simply doesn't have the supporting units needed to sustain it when deployed.""We have no second echelon force to provide a third, reserve division, casualty replacements, or to create the basis of a larger wartime Army."Drummond argues that today, Britain needs two readily deployable mechanized divisions, one using tracked vehicles and a lighter unit on wheels, each of 25,000 troops. "In addition to this, we need training regiments and Army schools, and a regular reserve. Historically this has required 30,000 to 40,000 additional personnel. So the irreducible peacetime strength of the Army is 80,000 to 90,000 soldiers."If money is the root of all evil, then the British armed forces have been sinned against for 35 years. In 1984, the UK's defense spending was 5.5% of GDP. It is currently a bit over 2 percent, with the newly elected Labor government of <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/uk-labour-party-back-in-power-rishi-sunak-concede-defeat-2024-7">Prime Minister Keir Starmer</a> pledging to honor the previous Conservative government's to raise the defense budget to 2.5%. This is less than America's 3.5% spent on defense, though it exceeds NATO's goal — which many members have yet to fulfill — of 2% of GDP allocated to the military.It's not just the Army that is struggling. The British armed forces have been cut back to 183,000 personnel, and even then, they can't find enough recruits. A shortage of sailors has forced the Royal Navy to <a target="_blank" href="https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12928373/Royal-Navy-sailors-forced-decommission-two-warships-new-frigates-wont-unmanned.html">decommission warships</a>, and the <a target="_blank" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/british-raf-gets-f-35s-but-fleet-has-readiness-maintenance-issues-2019-1">Royal Air Force</a> can't attract enough <a target="_blank" href="https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/raf-admits-urgent-need-to-solve-shortage-of-trained-pilots-2083957">pilots</a>.To be fair, the problem is caused by more than stingy government bean-counters. With many nations abolishing conscription, and civilian careers seen as more lucrative, this is not a good time to be a military recruiter anywhere. But as a nation past its imperial glory, Britain has prided itself on punching above its weight. A skeleton army won't help.Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy magazine, and other publications. He holds an MA in political science from Rutgers Univ. Follow him on <a target="_blank" href="https://www.twitter.com/@mipeck1">Twitter</a> and <a target="_blank" href="https://www.linkedin.com/in/mipeck/">LinkedIn</a>.

The British Army has shrunk to its smallest size since the Napoleonic wars 

<ul class="summary-list"><li>Ukraine's IT army says it has launched thousands of attacks on Russian organizations.</li><li>The group, formed shortly after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, has members from around the world.</li></ul>Shortly after <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/category/russia-ukraine-war">Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine</a>, the Ukrainian government issued a clarion call to tech wizzes around the world to use their skills in the fight against the invading nation."We are creating an IT army. We need digital talents," Mykhailo Fedorov, Ukraine's then-deputy prime minister, <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/ukraine-assembles-it-army-to-attack-russia-in-cyberspace-2022-2">wrote on X at the time</a>.Eager volunteers quickly responded to the plea, and within a month, the group's Telegram channel counted around 300,000 subscribers.As the number of members increased, so did the IT army's activity, and by late May, the group had already <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://t.me/mintsyfra/3065">launched</a> an estimated 2,000 cyberattacks on Russian organizations, Ukraine's Digital Transformation Ministry said on Telegram.A spokesperson for the group, who goes by the name Ted, told Business Insider that they "currently see tens of thousands of devices and possibly thousands of people behind them.""While we experience a constant decline in the number of subscribers [to the army's Telegram channel], the number of active devices involved is growing," Ted added.Though the exact location of participants is unknown, the army is international in reach, Ted said.The IT army website provides detailed resources that explain in Ukrainian and English how volunteers can help, with guides on how to install the "IT Army Kit," which contains tools required for conducting <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://www.businessinsider.com/russian-cyberattacks-on-ukraine-may-have-gotten-out-of-hand-2022-5">cyberattacks</a>.Volunteers can even use the toolkit to set up the attacks to run in the background, preventing tasks from disrupting their daily activities.Leaderboard statistics are also posted to help gamify the process, increasing engagement and promoting competition among users.<h2 id="ab88f3cb-335d-4bd3-bb30-9b091bfc97ee">Russian organizations are vulnerable to cyberwarfare, experts say</h2>Russian organizations are particularly susceptible to things like a DDoS (distributed denial-of-service) attack — which is an effort to overload a website or network.In the West, there are a number of services that help protect companies from DDoS attacks, Alan Woodward, a professor at the Surrey Centre for Cyber Security at the University of Surrey, told BI.In Russia, however, "they have the expertise but not necessarily the service providers who sit in front of organisations to detect and deflect DDoS attacks," Woodward added.In June, the IT army said it had launched a major DDoS attack against Russian banks, including VTB, Gazprombank, Sberbank, and a number of others, as well as the country's Mir payment system — Russia's equivalent of Visa or Mastercard.<div type="image" title="A man walks past VTB Bank at the Gum Building." height="683" width="1024" msid="112065024" hostid="261"></div>Woodward said the incident "certainly left the impression that the group is capable of mounting significant attacks."The IT army and other hacktivist groups have also managed to hit Russian media outlets.In June 2023, Russian state TV and other channels <a target="_blank" href="https://www.yahoo.com/entertainment/russia-state-tv-hacked-millions-113800186.html">were targeted by hackers</a>, with a video broadcast in Ukrainian warning viewers: "The hour of reckoning has come."Cyberattacks such as these play a "very important role" in Ukraine's cyberdefense, Stefan Soesanto, a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich, told BI."While most of their DDoS efforts only cause short term disruptions, they are persistent when it comes to specific Russian businesses and platforms," he said. "They will target them over and over again."Roskomnadzor, Russia's federal censorship agency, said it had repelled almost three times more DDoS attacks in the first quarter of 2024 than in all of 2023, Russian news website <a target="_blank" href="https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6649341?from=glavnoe_6">Kommersant reported</a>.Such attacks may also help "support defensive movements of the Ukrainian army," said Vasileios Karagiannopoulos, an associate professor in cybercrime and cybersecurity at the University of Portsmouth.They can "help with countering misinformation efforts and facilitate things at a cyberespionage level," he said."It also helps to symbolically generate an image of vulnerability that can impact on the morale of the opponents and respectively boost the morale of Ukrainian troops and citizens," Karagiannopoulos added.<h2 id="29f85455-8790-4939-b99d-d1ad5521ae4f">Ukraine's government may want to keep its distance from the group</h2>The IT army has an internal team, which some experts <a target="_blank" class="" href="https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Cyber-Reports-2022-06-IT-Army-of-Ukraine.pdf">believe</a> was taken over by the Ukrainian intelligence service and the country's Ministry of Defense."The IT Army is managed by the SBU and the Ukrainian MoD," Soesanto said, adding that they receive support from Ukraine's Ministry of Digital Transformation."The volunteers who are nowadays participating in the IT Army do not know which sites, IP addresses, and services they are DDoS [attacking]," he said, adding that it had all been "centralized, with a handful of people making the targeting decisions."Ted told BI that "the MoD does not run the IT army, but there is collaboration to ensure efforts are synchronized."Ukraine's Ministry of Defense did not respond to a request for comment from BI on the nature of its relationship with the IT army.The Ukrainian government likely wants to keep the group "at arms length," Woodward said."Or at the very least organise matters such that there is plausible deniability by the Ukrainian government if an attack results in unwelcome, albeit unintentional, consequences," he added.One of the main risks with the force, Karagiannopoulos said, is that sometimes "volunteers might not follow instructions" and "organize their own attacks," potentially impacting people "across different countries and networks.It is also unclear "whether these individuals could be targeted by the Russian military as combatants when they are considered to take direct part in hostilities," he added.Nonetheless, the IT army is a "world first," Karagiannopoulos continued. "We have an explicit call from government officials for people to join," yet these hackers are not a formal part of the Ukrainian military.This will set a precedent for future conflicts as cyberwarfare becomes more common, he added.

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