The idea of an anti-ISIS grand coalition is a myth
ISW and CTP will publish the findings of this exercise in multiple reports. The first report examined America's global grand strategic objectives as they relate to the threat from ISIS and al Qaeda.
This second report defines American strategic objectives in Iraq and Syria, identify the minimum necessary conditions for ending the conflicts there, and compare US objectives with those of Iran, Russia, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in order to understand actual convergences and divergences.
The differences mean that the US cannot rely heavily on international partners to achieve its objectives. Subsequent reports will provide a detailed assessment of the situation on the ground in Syria and present the planning group's evaluation of several courses of action.
The key findings of this second report are:
- The US must accomplish four strategic objectives in Iraq and Syria to achieve vital national interests and secure its people: 1) destroy enemy groups; 2) end the communal, sectarian civil wars; 3) set conditions to prevent the reconstitution of enemy groups; and 4) extricate Iraq and Syria from regional and global conflicts.
- Any American strategy must take urgent measures to strengthen Iraqi Prime Minister Abadi and prepare contingency efforts for his fall. The collapse of the Abadi government and return of his predecessor Nuri al Maliki would be disastrous for the fight against ISIS.
- Ongoing international negotiations within the Vienna Framework are bypassing essential requirements for long-term success in Syria. Re-establishing a stable, unitary Syrian state that secures American interests requires the US and its partners to 1) destroy ISIS, Jabhat al Nusra, and foreign Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria; 2) identify and strengthen interlocutors representing the Syrian opposition; 3) facilitate a negotiated settlement between the Syrian regime and opposition; 4) obtain regional acceptance of that settlement; 5) establish peace-enforcement mechanisms; and 6) reconstruct state institutions.
- The Salafi-jihadi militant base in Syria poses a threat to the US, but the US must not simply attack it because that would put the US at war with many Sunnis who must be incorporated into a future, post-Assad inclusive government. The US must separate reconcilable from irreconcilable elements. These other Salafi-jihadi groups must meet the following conditions essential for core US security objectives in order to participate: break with Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS; accept the principle of a future pluralistic and unitary Syrian state; reject violent jihad; commit to disarming to a policing and defensive level; and commit to the elimination of the current shari'a court system and the establishment of political institution-based governance.
- The superficial convergence of Iranian, Russian, Turkish, and Saudi strategic objectives with those of the US on ISIS as a threat masks significant divergences that will undermine US security requirements. Iran and Russia both seek to reduce and eliminate US influence in the Middle East and are not pursuing strategies that will ultimately defeat al Qaeda and ISIS in Syria or Iraq. Turkey's support for the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups, some linked to al Qaeda, stem from the ruling party's intent to reestablish itself as an independent, Muslim, regional power. Finally, Saudi Arabia's objectives remain shaped by perceived existential threats from Iran and a growing succession crisis, causing key divergences, especially over support to Salafi-jihadi groups. The US must lead efforts to resolve the crisis in Syria and cannot outsource them to partners.