- US shouldn't support or extend a security guarantee — through NATO or bilaterally — to Ukraine.
- Doing so would endanger US national security and increase the odds of a direct clash with Russia.
Ukraine Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov said recently that "the main event" of his country's ongoing offensive against Russia could occur any day. "When it happens," he warned, "you will all see it."
It is possible Reznikov and his president Volodymyr Zelensky will seek to go all-out with their offensive before the July NATO Summit in Vilnius to bolster Ukraine's goal of receiving a NATO security guarantee.
However, no matter what happens with this offensive push, under no circumstances should the United States support or extend a security guarantee — whether as part of a NATO Article 5 provision or a bilateral arrangement — to Ukraine. Doing so would make the odds of a direct military clash with nuclear-armed Russia rise to unacceptable highs, while posing an unnecessary danger to American national security.
Ukraine's offensive has thus far produced minimal gains and alarmed some supporters who fear Kyiv might lose Western support if the operation to drive Russia out of Ukrainian territory fails. With the NATO Summit taking place this week, Zelensky may feel pressured to produce tangible battlefield results and is likely to order a major increase in the scale of his offensive.
Zelensky may believe that he must reclaim a major chunk of occupied territory or deliver an impressive victory—or else NATO leaders may conclude the time has arrived to encourage Ukraine to seek a negotiated settlement with Russia. Desires and motivations aside, the tactical task Zelensky has given his military is far more difficult than commonly realized.
The New York Times published a new detailed analysis of the defensive barriers Russia erected in the Ukrainian territory it occupies and lays bare the difficulty that any military force would have in seizing even Tokmak, a city 15 miles from the current front line — which, as the analysis graphically displays, has only moved about 2 miles since June 4.
As I have previously described in detail, this 2-mile portion is only what the Russians call the security zone; the truly tough parts of the defensive system lie ahead of the Ukrainian advance. In a recent press briefing, National Security Council spokesman John Kirby sought to tamp down expectations of a quick Ukrainian victory, highlighting the difficulties Zelensky's troops faced.
Kirby said the reason the offensive was "going slower" than some expected was that "the Russians have invested a lot in the last six, eight months in terms of defensive capabilities. In some cases, their defensive lines are three deep. And by 'three deep,' I don't mean just 3 feet. I mean, miles and miles and miles deep."
Ukraine has reportedly massed troops in at least three areas behind the current front lines and appears poised to launch a major assault at any moment, likely to produce some tangible territorial result prior to the start of the NATO summit.
Western leaders — and American leaders in particular — must not become distracted by any tactical actions and instead remain focused on issues of strategic importance, especially when it comes to considerations of extending NATO membership or security guarantees in any form. We already know from leaked documents earlier this year that senior leaders privately believe the Ukrainian offensive will bog down into a stalemate.
I concur with that assessment, and the likelihood of a stalemate should end any consideration of providing Ukraine security guarantees. Emotions aside, there are very practical reasons for such reticence.
First, any consideration of extending a security guarantee — to any nation, not just Ukraine — must include a benefit to our country. Plainly stated, Russian conventional forces do not pose a risk to American national security. Whether Ukraine wins the war or suffers defeat, our security would remain equally secure.
One thing these 16 months of war have graphically proven is that the Russian army is not capable of marching on a single NATO state, much less taking on the entire 31-member alliance. The events of Prigozhin's failed rebellion serve only to further highlight Russian limitations. Most likely, this war will eventually be resolved in a negotiated settlement of some sort where neither Russia nor Ukraine are fully victorious on the battlefield.
Given the geography and history, Russia will remain a potential risk to Ukraine regardless of the conditions that ultimately end the conflict. It would be highly unwise to extend any form of a security guarantee to Kyiv that would tie American national security to a volatile cross-border relationship between Russia and Ukraine that could, at any time, flare into renewed fighting. Making good on a promise to defend Ukraine in the future could put the US face-to-face with the very real possibility of a nuclear exchange.
No matter what happens with Zelensky's current offensive — win, lose, or draw — the United States should not consider any security guarantees for Ukraine. We can continue providing them means to defend themselves, support armed neutrality, or other means of support. What we should never do, however, is put our own country in a position where we surrender our security in hopes of defending another. In the end, we would help neither Ukraine nor America.
Daniel L. Davis is a senior fellow for Defense Priorities and a former lieutenant colonel in the US Army who deployed into combat zones four times. Follow him at @DanielLDavis1.