Putin may finally be giving the US something it really wants: a Europe that can actually defend itself

• After one week, Russia's war on Ukraine has already precipitated a transformation of European security.
• European countries have rallied to sanction Russia and aid Ukraine, and many plan to expand and strengthen their militaries.

After one week, with the most serious fighting surely still to come, Russia's war on Ukraine has already precipitated a transformation of European security.

Vladimir Putin may well accomplish his immediate military goals in Ukraine, but the victory will be a Pyrrhic one. Europe's post-Cold War holiday from hard power and hard choices is finally over.

For more than a half-century, American presidents have complained about European free-riding and unwillingness to shoulder a fair share of the collective defense burden under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At the height of the Cold War, even avowed Atlanticists like President Dwight Eisenhower fumed that the Europeans were all but "making a sucker out of Uncle Sam."

After the fall of the Soviet Union, all NATO nations, America included, took a peace dividend and cut their militaries. But many European countries went far beyond that, choosing military emasculation. Germany was the worst culprit.

The Bundeswehr, a sizable and respected frontline army during the Cold War, became a hollow force. By 2017, most of Germany's fighter aircraft were grounded due to maintenance shortfalls and all six of its submarines were unavailable. During an exercise with NATO's rapid response force, a German battalion had to resort to using black broomsticks as stand-ins for its machine guns.

European nations ignored the growing gap between their militaries and US forces for nearly 30 years, even after European inadequacy was laid bare during the bombing campaigns in Kosovo and Libya. The war in Afghanistan, to which most NATO members sent some troops, further exposed the limits of European military capacity and risk tolerance.

War, many European leaders felt, was outmoded — at least for their continent. Economic strength and "soft power" was what mattered in the 21st century. Boutique armies were only really needed for multilateral humanitarian interventions abroad. Territorial defense was no longer a real concern.

Growing Russian revanchism over the past 15 years failed to shatter these illusions, though the annexation of Crimea in 2014 did help spur a renewed seriousness about security in some non-NATO European militaries.

In 2018 Sweden restored its military draft, a staple of its Cold War defense, while neighboring Finland created rapid reaction readiness units to forestall the threat of Russian "little green men." In December, Finland announced that it was replacing its aging F-18s with 64 new F-35 fighters — the per capita equivalent of 3,840 F-35s for the US.

But most of Europe continued to slumber under an American security blanket, with only rhetorical nods to the changing security climate. European NATO members spent an average of 1.7% of GDP on their militaries, less than half of what the US allocates to defense. Most of that spending was on pensions and manpower, not modern weapons, ordnance, and communications systems.

The ability to project meaningful combat power, even within Europe, disappeared. A 2017 RAND Corporation report found that Britain and France, the continent's best-funded and most capable militaries, would take a month or more to get a single armored brigade to the vulnerable Baltic states.

Ukraine has changed all that, literally overnight. Europe has united to levy unexpectedly harsh economic sanctions on Russia and rush military aid to Ukraine. Finland and Sweden, neutral and non-aligned for the entire Cold War, are having a serious debate about joining NATO.

Sweden, which last fought a war in 1814, has just sent 5,000 anti-tank weapons to Ukraine. Even Turkey, a recalcitrant ally for many years now, has sold drones to Ukraine and is planning to block some Russian warships from accessing the Black Sea.

But it is in Germany, NATO's latent power and biggest laggard, that the change has been seismic. On Sunday, new Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that Germany would increase its defense budget to 2% of GDP (as it has long promised) and make an enormous $113 billion commitment to rearmament this year.

As head of the Social Democratic Party (SPD), long inclined to accommodate Russia, Scholz promises to bring the rest of Germany along with him in this newfound dedication to national defense and collective security. Outside, a half-million demonstrators rallied in Berlin to support Ukraine.

Thanks to Putin's recklessness, the US may finally have something it has desired for decades: a Europe that takes its defense seriously. As the leader of NATO's preeminent power, President Joe Biden can bend this sea change to America's broader strategic advantage — if he is willing to resist the urge to reflexively reinforce Europe once this immediate crisis has passed.

Absent some major geopolitical surprise, Russia is likely to be an enduring adversary of Europe and the US for a generation. But America's greatest threat is still five time zones away: the People's Republic of China.

Europe, with triple the population and nearly 10 times the GDP, has ample resources to contain Russia. Now, it may finally have found the will.

Regardless of the outcome in Ukraine, German frigates belong in the Baltic, not the South China Sea. European commandos should be preparing to counter Russian irregular warfare, not looking for counter-terrorism missions as Americans do.

If NATO's European members are finally ready to step up and check Russia, America can realize its postponed pivot to Asia and fully focus on competition with China. The biggest impact of the war in Ukraine may be felt a continent away.

Gil Barndollar is a senior fellow at Defense Priorities.