- Turkey is heading to an election that may unseat its longtime leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
- Western observers dislike Erdogan's foreign policy, but a different leader is unlikely to change course.
On May 14, Turkish voters will head to the ballot box to elect their next president.
At a moment of global upheaval, Turkey's unique geopolitical position allows it to play an outsized role in international politics. As a result, Turkey is frequently castigated for taking stances that contravene Western preferences.
Critics charge that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's foreign policy is a direct outgrowth of his illiberal posture at home rather than shrewd geopolitics. But this interpretation is wrong: Turkey's robust economic ties with Russia and regional security concerns make it highly unlikely another leader will seek closer alignment with the West.
Whether Erdogan or his challenger, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, wins, the interests guiding Turkey's foreign policy will require the same balancing act that eschews alignment with any great-power bloc and maximizes Ankara's freedom of action. As difficult as US policymakers might find Erdogan to deal with, Kilicdaroglu's approach to foreign affairs will not be pro-Western either.
Most notably, this balancing act has been on display throughout the Russo-Ukrainian War. Turkey has served as the primary intermediary between Kyiv and Moscow, facilitating prisoner exchanges, the Black Sea Grain Initiative, and peace talks at the onset of the conflict.
At Ukraine's request, Ankara's stewardship of the Montreux Convention has prevented warships from transiting the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits into the Black Sea. (Although there is evidence Russia is using civilian vessels to carry military cargo.)
However, Ankara has not joined the Western sanctions campaign against Russia. Since the breakout of the war, Turkey has become a major hub for Russian investment, with post-invasion monthly trade volume increasing 198 percent and bilateral payment systems being adopted to facilitate financial transactions outside of SWIFT.
Unsurprisingly, Turkey has come under pressure from US officials to "conduct enhanced due diligence on transactions with Russian entities and individuals" to avoid "a potential loss of access to G7 markets and correspondent relationships." But given Turkey's economic turmoil and dependence on Russian imports, Kilicdaroglu has pledged not to enforce the G7's sanctions and maintain economic relations with Moscow.
Like Erdogan, there are signs that Kilicdaroglu would work to "resolve" the Russo-Ukrainian War by advocating a "face-saving solution" acceptable to both sides. Moreover, according to an official from the Turkish opposition, to avoid a prolonged stand-off between Russia and the West after a settlement is reached, "[we] need a stable [security] architecture and we cannot leave Russia out of the picture."
This perspective is markedly different from that in Western capitals, most of which are exclusively focused on post-war security guarantees for Ukraine without considering how the Euro-Atlantic order can be restructured to stabilize relations with Russia over the long-term.
Sharp differences between Turkey and the United States will endure elsewhere. In Syria, where the United States is allied with Kurdish militias Ankara considers adjacent to terrorist groups, Washington will not find a more conciliatory interlocutor in Kilicdaroglu. Erdogan has initiated a rapprochement process with Bashar al-Assad, but Kilicdaroglu has indicated he would be even more open to dialogue with Damascus to facilitate the return of millions of Syrian refugees residing in Turkey.
And no matter what Washington says, Kilicdaroglu will also continue to rely on military force to protect Turkey's southeastern border from attacks launched by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). One opposition official described the conditions for a Turkish withdrawal from Syria as contingent on revitalizing the 1998 Adana agreement which prevented Damascus from harboring terrorist groups and permitted Turkey to conduct self-defensive military operations up to five kilometers across the Syrian border.
However, recent events should encourage US policymakers to consider the merits of conceding to Turkish interests in the region. During an operation in northern Syria last month, Turkish special forces reportedly raided the compound of ISIS leader Abu Hussein al-Qurashi, who detonated a suicide vest to avoid capture.
This episode demonstrated how Turkey, which has a strong military, experience conducting counter-terrorism operations, and intelligence-sharing relationships with its neighbors, is capable of neutralizing ISIS remnants in its backyard. Rather than continuing to run the risk of confrontation with Iranian-backed militias or Russian forces, US troops should withdraw and allow Ankara to take ownership of a messy situation in northern Syria.
By prioritizing independence and autonomy, foreign policy under a prospective Kilicdaroglu administration will embody a significant degree of continuity from his predecessor. US policymakers would be well advised to adopt the same approach to whoever wins over the Turkish public and not expect either candidate to make a hard turn westward.
Matthew C. Mai is a research associate at Defense Priorities.