In an exclusive interview, a top State Department spokesperson says Russia knows the invasion of Ukraine is going poorly: 'Putin is all too aware of the fact that his soldiers are coming home in body bags'

That all changed when President Joe Biden appointed Antony Blinken, who has advised him on foreign policy for more than a decade, as secretary of state. Blinken's ties to Europe also run deep. He spent much of his childhood in Paris and speaks often of his stepfather's experiences surviving the Nazi concentration camps of Auschwitz and Dachau.

The strength of Biden's relationship with Blinken is a key reason State Department diplomacy has been the leading edge of the US response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. A few short weeks have gone a long way toward reversing the Trump-era perception of America as an unreliable NATO member reluctant to underwrite European security. Biden and Blinken have succeeded at building a broad international alliance that stepped up to help Ukraine by enforcing economic sanctions and sending arms.

Working alongside Blinken to anchor Biden's Ukraine diplomacy is Ned Price, the State Department's spokesperson. In addition to fielding questions at daily press briefings, Price oversees a nonstop flow of official statements, meeting transcripts, and background briefings. He's privy to the administration's deliberations on Ukraine and plays an integral role in articulating its strategy and mindset.

In 2017, before his turn at the State Department podium, Price made a splash with a Washington Post op-ed article in which he explained why he had left the CIA, where he had served as an analyst, citing what he called Donald Trump's "disturbing" behavior after taking office. For the rest of Trump's term, he was a kind of spokesperson-in-exile for former senior officials who wanted to sound the alarm about Trump's slapdash, bellicose approach to national security. The so-called deep state was often just Price, wearing colorful socks and moccasins, fielding calls as he prepped for another interview in the NBC green room. I spoke with him by phone on Wednesday, March 16.

It seems like there has been a lot of optimism that there might be a negotiated settlement. Are you seeing any baby steps towards a peace agreement?

We are supporting our Ukrainian partners in their diplomacy with the Russian Federation, and there are a number of countries who have also engaged directly with the Russians. What we need to see is a change in course from Russia. We need to see actual signs of de-escalation. We need to see diminution of the violence. Ultimately, we need to see a withdrawal of Russian forces. Of course, we haven't seen any of those things. In recent days, we've even seen contrary indications. We've seen continued escalation. We've seen continued strikes against a maternity hospital, against residential buildings, against neighborhoods — all signs that the Russian Federation is not yet prepared to end the violence.

I've heard you say from the podium that the US is looking for some show of good faith on the part of Russia. What would be a minimum scenario for what might count as that, for the administration?

Well, we're not going to be prescriptive in terms of what de-escalation could look like. There are a number of ways the Russians could signal that they're serious about diplomacy. What we want to see is a diminution of the violence. What we want to see is humanitarian access — getting much-needed humanitarian supplies in, and civilian populations out. Every time there have been humanitarian corridors created, we have seen those efforts come to a screeching halt as a result of a Russian action. So there are a number of ways the Russians could signal that they're serious, that the Russians could bring this conflict to an end. But we haven't seen any of those yet.

President Biden has said that he considers Vladimir Putin to be a war criminal. And we've heard a lot of discussion from the administration about accountability for Putin. Is there a point at which justice and diplomacy start to butt heads? Can you seek both goals at once — peace in the short term, and accountability for Putin in the long term?

In the short term, those goals are actually complementary. I say that because there are a number of tactics we're pursuing to put pressure on Russia, to bring them to the negotiating table in good faith. One is to impose massive costs and consequences on the Russian economy. Another is the massive amounts of security assistance that we're providing our Ukrainian partners — $2 billion since the start of this administration. Those two lines of effort are actually reinforcing Ukraine at the negotiating table, and putting pressure on Russia at that negotiating table to demonstrate some degree of good faith.

This isn't the first rodeo for you, Secretary Blinken, and President Biden in terms of negotiating with the Russians. You were all in the loop when the Obama administration was trying to negotiate a peaceful resolution in Syria. Are there any big takeaways from that negotiation that are informing your approach now?

A couple things. The hallmark of our strategy that's informed by previous efforts at diplomacy with Russia is having allies and partners squarely on your side. In the case of Syria, we saw the international community come together and condemn what the Assad regime was doing at the time.

The United States alone, our economic might is sizeable. But when we work with Europe, when we work with our allies and partners, it's more than 60 percent of global GDP. When you wield that in the way we have, in terms of the economic sanctions, you see the implications of it quite clearly. The Russian stock market has been closed for weeks now. The ruble has gone through the floor. Russia's credit rating has junk status. Russia's on the verge of default. International companies are fleeing by the dozen. That speaks to the utility and effectiveness of working with our allies and partners.

The other lesson that many have taken away from our previous forays may be a spin on "trust but verify." Today there may be quite a bit of skepticism with everything we've heard from Russia, so it may be more a strategy of distrust and verify.

I heard Ben Rhodes, Obama's deputy national security adviser, say something to the effect of, "Going into the Syria negotiations, we felt that Vladimir Putin was willing to do the right thing for the Russian people. What we didn't realize was that he was only going to do the right thing for Vladimir Putin." Do you have a plan for how to get Putin back to a place where he has a broader interest in mind? Or is it more a matter of making sure that any solution is tied directly to his own self-interest?

Clearly, Putin has demonstrated that it's going to be self-interest that motivates him. So that's why, for the first time, we've sanctioned Putin personally. We've gone after Russian oligarchs and his cronies to put pressure on him. Not only on his economy but on him personally, so that he hears directly from those around him. Whether they're in government, whether they're oligarchs who over the years have amassed fortunes in ill-begotten wealth, pilfered from the Russian people — all of that will put pressure on him personally. I think the point is right that we can't appeal to his better angels, to the welfare of the Russian people. Because what he seems to be prizing most are his own personal interests.

Going back to Inauguration Day, how high was a Russian invasion of Ukraine on your list of possible threat scenarios?

From Day One, we recognized that Russia would pose a challenge across any number of fronts. And early on in this administration, we responded to Russia's election interference. We responded to its use of chemical weapons against Alexei Navalny. We responded to the SolarWinds hack and to its human rights abuses at home. We were also very aware of President Putin's track record — in 2014 in Ukraine, in 2008 in Georgia, in the continuing presence of Russian troops on sovereign Moldovan soil. So it was something that was always high on the agenda. In the early part of the administration, there were efforts to determine if we could have a relationship with Moscow that was more stable and more predictable. As time went on, it became clear that was not something President Putin was interested in.

So there was outreach to Russia? Were there hints of a constructive conversation?

One of the first things we did in the administration was to extend the New START Treaty, to continue to impose caps on Russia's nuclear stockpile. There was also a summit between President Biden and President Putin in June of last year, to see if we could have a relationship that was more stable, and more predictable. I think Putin has made very clear that this is not something he is willing to entertain.

There was an unprecedented release of US intelligence prior to the invasion, and you were a part of that. In some ways, the intel releases were a great success. They eliminated any Russian pretext for the invasion. Was there a hope that the release of that intelligence might cause Russia to turn aside and reconsider?

That was one element of it. There was an element of deterrence, the possibility that by exposing Russia's plans, we'd be able to forestall aggression against Ukraine.

But the other element is what we're seeing now — that the world would have its eyes wide open, knowing that this was Putin's intent all along. Now that we're hearing false claims about US chemical weapons labs, or the absurd idea that the United States or Ukraine would employ chemical or biological weapons, the international public is much more attuned to the fact that these are the tactics that the Russians engage in — disinformation, misinformation, propaganda. It's something that is well known and digested.

Did you anticipate that there would be some doubt domestically about whether you had it right, given all the intelligence mistakes in the lead up to the US invasion of Iraq? People were being asked to take this on faith.

Look, I don't want to characterize what the popular perception was.

How can the intelligence community build back trust, post Iraq? I'm wondering if you have any thoughts on that dilemma.

It's not for me to speak to.

It's clear there's something of a bubble around Putin, and that material that reaches him is filtered, to some degree. And there's a lot of bad news, at least from where Putin stands, coming out of Ukraine, in terms of the situation on the battlefield. Are there things you can do to make sure that he's getting accurate information about where things actually stand on the ground?

Secretary Blinken has made the point that an Achilles' heel of all autocrats is the fact that they often do not get accurate information from those around them. And that could well have been the case here, where President Putin was fed what he wanted to hear from his subordinates and loyalists in the government.

Clearly this has not gone according to anyone's plan — or at least not according to anyone's plan in Russia.

Is there a worry that the bubble isn't being pierced now? Peace negotiations might depend on Putin appreciating that Russia is not winning this war.

I think he is all too aware of the fact that his soldiers are coming home in body bags, if they are coming home at all from Ukraine. That his economy is in tatters. That there have been signs of dissension across the country, some broadcast literally on national TV. So I think it's all too clear to him, the cost of this. If he thought this would be a feat he could undertake with ease, he now knows that he was sorely mistaken.

How would you assess his position domestically, and his ability to stay in power if the status quo prevails?

Look, that's going to be a question for the people of Russia. We've seen forms of dissent and opposition on a scale that we heretofore haven't seen. There have been protests across dozens of Russian cities, including Putin's hometown of Saint Petersburg. More than 15,000 people have been arrested for peacefully demonstrating. All of this is a signal that his war effort does not have universal support in Russia. Far from it.