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About half of that was dropped on Germany, as the Allies attempted to break the back of the Nazi war machine that sent German troops and tanks to the English Channel and the gates of Moscow.
In Germany, the air campaign produced horrors like the February 1945 bombing of Dresden, which killed roughly 25,000 people, many of them civilians and refugees, in the resulting firestorm.
It also took a heavy toll on the forces sent to carry out the devastation. The US 8th Air Force, based in England, took about half of the entire US Army Air Force's casualties - 47,482 out of 115,332, including more than 26,000 killed.
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Perhaps its most severe losses came during the bombing of ball-bearing plants around Schweinfurt, in south-central Germany, on October 14, 1943, which author Martin Caidin described as the "most violent, savagely fought, and bloodiest of all the battles in the titanic aerial conflict waged in the high arena over Germany."
Below, you can see how "Black Thursday" unfolded for the Allies.
Under the Combined Bomber Offensive, which began in mid-1943, air forces from the US, UK, and Canada aimed to destroy German industry. The primary portion of the offensive was Operation Pointblank, targeting shipyards, vehicle and aircraft factories, oil production, and other manufacturing sites — including ball-bearing factories.
In the early days of the war, the US Army Air Force was not only working to destroy German targets but also to prove that daylight bombing by unescorted bombers was a viable doctrine.
Operation Pointblank instructed the US 8th Air Force and the Royal Air Force Bomber Command to go after specific factories, mostly during daylight raids. On August 17, 1943, the first major attack aimed at the German aircraft industry took place over Schweinfurt and Regensburg, both in south-central Germany.
1940s-era German machinery was believed to be more dependent on ball bearings than most, which made the ball-bearing factories around Schweinfurt high-value targets.
While the British advocated a general bombing campaign against German cities, US commanders pushed for precision attacks against specific industrial targets.
"It is better to cause a high degree of destruction in a few essential industries ... than to cause a small degree in many," Army Air Force analysts argued, and 8th Air Force's commander Gen. Ira Eaker said such a campaign would make a ground invasion possible sooner than would indiscriminate bombing of cities.
The targets of the August 17 raid were damaged but not destroyed. Allied strategists thought a second raid was necessary. While the German factories were able to recover from one attack, Nazi planners saw their vulnerability and started dispersing production and moved fighters from the Russian front to counter the bombers.
The first operation against Schweinfurt was a costly one. The US lost 24 B-17s attacking the city and another 36 in the assault on an aircraft factory in the city of Regensburg — a total of 19%. Nearly 600 US airmen were lost.
The ambitious doubled-pronged attack was undermined by poor weather, which delayed the launch of one of the air divisions involved. The three-hour delay gave German aircraft time to attack the first wave and then refuel and rearm before attacking the second.
Albert Speer, the Nazi armaments and war-production minister, said after the war that ball-bearing production dropped 38% after the August 17 attack (US intelligence said only 34%) and would have been much worse if the US had not made the "crucial mistake" of dividing its bombers between the two cities.
The second Schweinfurt raid, called Mission 115, was preceded by a three-day operation against multiple cities and targets in Germany, beginning October 8. Nearly 1,000 heavy bombers launched, and of them 88 aircraft and nearly 900 men were lost, but planners remained committed to Mission 115.
Heavy losses had an effect on the airmen who survived. Four days before Mission 115, the medical officer for the 381st Bomber Group wrote that "morale is the lowest that has yet been observed."
Eighth Air Force bomber crews awoke before dawn on October 14, 1943, to begin their briefings for the second raid. The high altitudes in which they would be flying required heavy flying gear and boots over their normal uniforms, as well as heated suits and oxygen bottles. Each member of the bomber's 10-man crew — average age of 22 — carried fitted parachutes.
Nearly 400 bombers were assigned to Mission 115, escorted by P-47 Thunderbolt fighters over the English Channel and into France. But the bombers would have to enter and exit Germany on their own.
The bombers roared off runways across England a little before 10 a.m. that day, but poor weather and other issues immediately fouled up the plan. Only 29 of 60 B-24 Liberators were able to take off, and the ones that made it up were eventually sent on a diversionary attack.
The P-47s escorts, some of which were disrupted by poor weather conditions, fended off and shot down some German fighters. But many Luftwaffe planes, aware of the P-47's range limitations, delayed their attacks until the escorts broke off.
Another 33 B-17s aborted as the bombers approached Schweinfurt, leaving only 285 bombers to carry out the mission. They rolled through in two waves, one between 2:39 pm and 2:45 pm and the next between 2:51 pm and 2:57 pm.
German air defenses, reinforced after the August attack, preyed on the US bombers. "The fighters were unrelenting. It was simply murder," said Carl Abele, a B-17 navigator.
"The opening play is a line plunge through center," mission commander Col. Bud Peaslee told Martin Caidin, author of the 1960 book "Black Thursday," of the German counterattacks.
"The fighters whip through our formation ... Another group of flashes replaces the first, and this is repeated five times, as six formations of Me-109s charges us ... I can see fighters on my side ... their paths marked in the bright sunlight by fine lines of light-colored smoke as they fire short bursts. It is a coordinated attack ... their timing is perfect, their technique masterly."
"We saw everything imaginable thrown at us. Fighters ... lined up at beyond our gun range and began launching rockets that appeared to be like a telephone pole as they passed by us and exploded," said Sgt. John Piazza, a gunner. "Some enemy aircraft flew above us towing bombs on long cables hoping to entangle the cable on a Flying Fortress. We had never seen so many enemy fighters before or afterwards."
Only 248 bombers remained for the final bomb run, and aircrews faced intense but sporadic attacks during the flight home, as weather continued to interfere with Allied fighter support. US gunners claimed to have shot down 186 enemy aircraft, though German documents later indicated only 40 were lost.
The scale of the losses became apparent as bombers started returning to their bases. Sixty bombers were lost over Europe, along with 642 airmen. Another five bombers were lost near or over England; 121 of those that returned had moderate damage, and 17 were damaged beyond repair. Just 33 bombers, 12% of the force, remained undamaged.
More than 60 of those airmen who were lost bailed out and were captured. While such attacks, if repeated regularly, could have crippled German's war industry, the Allies did not have the resources to continue mounting them. US Army Air Force leaders put their bombing campaign on hold to review their strategy.
"The Strategic Bombing Survey reported that the consequences of our heavy losses of bombers in the second Schweinfurt raid were ominous. In one raid, the US Eighth Air Force had temporarily lost its air superiority over all German targets," Caidin wrote in his 1960 book, "Black Thursday."
"They had to rethink everything. They have lost the most amount of aircraft on a single mission on that particular day," Tim Bolin, whose father was captured after the raid, said during a memorial service this year.
Allied planners put more emphasis on long-range escorts, keeping the daylight-bombing campaign on hold until they could be provided. Long-range P-51 Mustangs fighters began arriving in December 1943, and commanders ordered more wing fuel tanks that could extend fighters' range. By February 1944, the campaign was on again, taking the air war deep into Germany.
